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Report Summary 
1. Introduction and background 
Would a more efficient use of energy resources reduce the environmental burden of economic 
activity?  This question has become prominent in recent years as governments across the world have 
implemented energy efficiency programs.   
 
Improvements in resource productivity have been suggested as both a measure of progress towards 
sustainable development and as a means of achieving sustainability (Cabinet Office, 2001). The 
popular interpretation of resource productivity is "doing more with less": that is, of reducing the 
material or energy requirements of economic activity. However, the presumption of the “conventional 
wisdom” that underlies current policy initiatives is that improving resource productivity will lower the 
burdens on the environment.  
 
In fact, there has been an extensive debate in the energy economics/ policy literature on the impact of 
improvements in energy efficiency in particular. This focuses on the notion of “rebound” effects, 
according to which the expected beneficial impacts on energy intensities are partially, or possibly 
even more than wholly in the case of “backfire”, offset as a consequence of the economic system’s 
responses to energy efficiency stimuli. The “Khazzoom-Brookes postulate” (Saunders, 1992) asserts 
that improvements in energy efficiency can actually stimulate the demand for energy, thereby 
nullifying the anticipated environmental benefits of such changes. Jevons (1865) was the first to argue 
for such an effect, in the context of improvements in the efficiency of coal use. Very recently the 
House of Lords have acknowledged that energy efficiency improvements alone might not deliver the 
expected environmental benefits. 
 
In this report we explore the conditions under which the notion that energy efficiency is environment-
enhancing would be expected to hold theoretically, and present some empirical evidence from an 
energy-economy-environment computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the UK economy. 
 
2. Theoretical analysis of resource productivity stimuli and rebound effects 
  
We begin by providing some background that appears to underlie the “conventional wisdom” that 
increases in resource efficiency reduce resource use. Overall, our view is that previous studies, even 
those most closely associated with the view that the macroeconomic rebound effect may be 
substantial, tend to understate the potential scope for rebound and backfire effects in open economies 
such as the UK. However, theoretical analysis alone can only hope to identify the conditions under 
which such effects are likely to arise. 
 
Undoubtedly the single most important conclusion of our theoretical analysis (in line with many 
previous analyses) is that the extent of rebound and backfire effects in response to energy efficiency 
stimuli depends on parameter values whose determination is an empirical issue. It is simply not 
possible to determine the degree of rebound and backfire from theoretical considerations alone, 
notwithstanding the claims of some contributors to the debate. In particular, theoretical analysis 
cannot rule out backfire. Nor, strictly, can theoretical considerations alone rule out the other limiting 
case, of zero rebound, that a narrow engineering approach would imply. However, in an open 
economy such as the UK it is virtually inconceivable that there would be no rebound effect associated 
with energy efficiency improvements, since this would require a whole set of extreme conditions. 
 
Secondly, while the presence of rebound does indeed reduce the environmental gain of energy 
efficiency stimuli, and backfire more than offset it, relative to what would be expected from a narrow 
engineering perspective, this reflects the presence of an economic gain that similarly would be 
unanticipated by such a perspective. Finally, the theoretical analysis serves to clarify the precise 
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nature of the evidence required to allow assessment of the likely scale of rebound effects. We use this 
to inform our brief summary of the existing empirical evidence.  
 
3. Existing empirical evidence 
 
A comprehensive review of the extant empirical evidence is well beyond the scope of this report and 
is, in any case, currently being undertaken by UKERC. (See Sorrell and Dimitopolous, (2005).) 
Rather, we attempt to provide a flavour of the evidence, and relate it to our discussion of the 
theoretical analysis.  
 
While there is a significant literature relevant to the rebound debate generally, at present there seems 
to be a dearth of empirical evidence for the UK. There is a wide range of evidence relevant to the 
scale of the rebound effect available for other countries, particularly the US (e.g. Greening et al, 
2000), much of which suggests that the rebound effect is present but is typically low-to-moderate in 
scale. However, these studies tend to be microeconomic in nature with a short-term focus, 
characteristics that may bias downwards estimates of the scale of rebound effects relevant to the 
macroeconomy (although our research finds greater effects in the short-run). There is, therefore, a 
need for UK empirical work that is focussed on the system-wide consequences of energy efficiency 
improvements, and that can accommodate long-run as well as short-run impacts. To address this 
lacuna we develop an energy-environment-economy computable general equilibrium model (CGE) of 
the UK. We then simulate the impact of across-the-board improvements in energy efficiency to begin 
to explore the likely scale of the macroeconomic rebound effect in the UK.  
 
4. UKENVI: An energy-economy-environment CGE of the UK 
   
CGE models are now being extensively used in studies of the energy- economy-environment nexus. 
The popularity of CGEs in this context reflects their multi-sectoral nature (since energy intensities 
vary widely), combined with their fully specified supply-side, which facilitates the analysis of both 
economic and environmental policies. Here we employ UKENVI, an energy-economy CGE 
modelling framework parameterised on UK data.  
 
The UKENVI framework allows a high degree of flexibility in the choice of key parameter values and 
model closures.  However, a crucial characteristic of the model is that, no matter how it is configured, 
we impose cost minimisation in production with multi-level production functions (see Figure 4.1), 
generally of a CES form but with Leontief and Cobb-Douglas being available as special cases. We 
generally impose a single UK labour market characterised by perfect sectoral mobility. As part of 
later sensitivity analysis we consider two alternative treatments of the labour market, but our central 
case embodies real wage bargaining.  
 
A major objective of our research is to incorporate sustainability indicator variables into a system-
wide model of the UK economy in order to track and explain the impact of policy actions (and other 
disturbances) on the UK’s progress towards sustainable development. In the first instance, we focus 
on resource productivity and pollution indicators.  
 
The main database of UKENVI is a specially constructed Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the 
UK economy. This required the construction of an input-output (IO) table for the UK for the year 
2000, since an appropriate analytical IO table has not been published for the UK since 1995.  A 
twenty-five sector SAM was then developed for the UK using the IO as a major input. The sectoral 
aggregation (identified in Appendix 2) is chosen to allow a focus on sectors within which there were 
activities affected by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.   
 
5. Results of the CGE simulations 
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Simulation strategy. The disturbance simulated using the UKENVI model is a 5 per cent 
improvement in the efficiency by which energy inputs are used by all production sectors.  The five 
energy sectors in UKENVI are the coal, oil, gas and renewable and non-renewable electricity.  An 
efficiency shock is introduced in the production of the local composite good.  This shock is a one-off 
step change in energy efficiency, which is introduced as a composite energy-augmenting type. This 
introduces a beneficial supply-side disturbance, which would be expected to lower the price of 
energy, measured in efficiency units, generally reduce the price of outputs and stimulate economic 
activity. 
 
Central case scenario. The energy efficiency improvement has a positive impact on UK economic 
activity, which is greater in the long run than in the short run. In the long run there is an increase of 
0.17% in GDP and 0.21% in employment and exports. The expansion is lower in the short run (over 
which capital stocks are fixed), where a larger increase in consumption partially offsets a fall in 
exports.  
 
The energy efficiency improvements primarily increase the competitiveness of energy intensive 
sectors through a reduction in their relative price. In the long run two mechanisms drive this change in 
competitiveness. First, the increase in energy efficiency raises the production efficiency of energy 
intensive sectors by the greatest amount. Second, the production techniques used in energy sectors 
themselves are typically energy intensive, so that the price of energy tends to fall. For both these 
reasons, the price of energy-intensive sectors will experience relatively large reductions in price in the 
long run. 
 
A key result of this analysis is that there is a significant rebound effect.  Energy consumption, 
measured in electricity GWh, falls from the start and reaches its long-run equilibrium reduction of 
3.15% by around period 7. Thus, there is a rebound effect from the 5 per cent reduction in energy 
efficiency of the order of 37%, but no backfire effect is identified. The variation across energy and 
non-energy sectors (where activity is stimulated) can be explained by the differences in the degree to 
which each sector relies upon energy inputs for production, the share of value added in production and 
the destination of output of each sector. 
 
Sensitivity analysis around central case scenario. Our central case results are sensitive not just to the 
base year values in the UK SAM, but also to: the choice of parameters for key variables in the 
UKENVI model; possible recycling of any additional government revenues, and the cost of any 
energy efficiency improvements.  
 
Results of varying key elasticities. Since many of the key parameter values of UKENVI are not 
econometrically estimated, it is especially important to explore the impact of varying these on our 
results. 
 
We vary the key elasticity parameters from the values used to derive the central case results.  As 
would be expected, the higher the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy 
intermediate inputs, the greater GDP impact (to 0.18% as compared to the central scenario of 0.17%), 
and a much bigger rebound effect (60.1% compared to 37.0% in the central case).  Making it easier 
for sectors to substitute energy for non-energy inputs will lead to bigger price reductions. Conversely, 
lowering the elasticity of substitution inhibits sectors from making this substitution, and so lessens the 
GDP gain (to 0.16%) and the extent of rebound (to 25.6%). Note that the rebound effect is really quite 
sensitive to the value of this substitution elasticity – more so than is the impact on economic activity. 
 
When the elasticity of substitution between value added and intermediate goods is increased relative 
to the central scenario, the greater ease of substitution towards the now cheaper intermediate inputs 
produces a smaller overall effect on economic activity (0.15% stimulus to GDP as compared to 0.17% 
in the central scenario).  Here, energy inputs are substituted in favour of labour and capital inputs, and 
the extent of rebound increases significantly (to 56.4% from 37.0%), despite the lower level of 
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economic activity. Overall, our results do appear to confirm the views often expressed in the literature 
about the importance of the elasticity of substitution of energy for other inputs in governing the extent 
of the rebound effect. 
 
As the elasticity of export demand is increased, sales to exports expand as a result of the greater 
responsiveness to the UK price reductions generated by the energy efficiency stimulus. However, the 
impact of varying these elasticities on economic activity is slight. This is primarily because those 
sectors that have the largest reduction in price are primarily the energy sectors that, in the main, do 
not export in the UK case. Rebound is also barely affected by changes in these elasticities.  
 
Results of enforcing government budget constraint. In the central case and all sensitivity 
simulations reported so far, the improvement in energy efficiency stimulates aggregate economic 
output and employment. This stimulates government revenues and reduces some expenditures, but 
earlier results assume the government simply responds by increasing its savings. In the UKENVI 
model the government budget constraint can be imposed in two ways. These have quite different 
economic impacts.   
 
First, additional revenue can be used to expand general government expenditure, distributed across 
sectors using the base-year weights. When the additional tax revenues are recycled as extra 
government expenditure, this acts as an exogenous demand injection and further stimulates GDP (to 
0.2% from 0.17% in the central scenario – see Table 5.5). However, in this case the extent of rebound 
actually falls, albeit very slightly (to 36.7% from 37.0%) reflecting the relative energy intensities of 
government expenditures. The economic impacts are greater still if revenues are used to reduce 
income tax rates (with a GDP stimulus of 0.34%). Overall, the recycling of government revenues 
generated by the energy efficiency stimulus tends to significantly improve the economic benefits with 
little adverse impact (and in the case of the government expenditure stimulus a slight gain) in terms of 
the extent of rebound. 
 
Results of implementing a costly energy efficiency policy. To explore the impact of costly policies 
we simulate the same 5% improvement in energy efficiency across all sectors, but simultaneously 
model a negative cost to the efficiency of labour inputs in production.  This can be thought of as 
representing the additional costs to labour required to effect the improvement in energy efficiency. 
Overall, if energy efficiency improvements are costly their rebound effect will be less, but so to will 
the economic gain (and this could even become negative). 
 
Results of implementing different labour market closure. In the central case scenario, and all other 
sensitivity so far, we have used a bargained real wage closure in the labour market in which workers’ 
bargaining power is inversely related to the unemployment rate.  Two other specifications are 
simulated: firstly where aggregate labour supply is exogenous, and secondly, where real wages are 
fixed.   
 
Fixing aggregate labour supply in the face of energy efficiency improvements produces higher 
nominal and real take home consumption wages, and a small reduction in GDP in the long run 
(0.037%).  Rebound in energy consumption falls slightly to 32.9%.  A fixed real wage on the other 
hand, produces considerable increases in employment in the long run (up 0.95%), and an increase in 
GDP of 0.90%.  Total energy consumption falls in the long run by 2.4%, indicating a rebound effect 
of 51.7%. 
 
6. Policy implications 
 
Rebound and backfire are of considerable potential relevance to climate change policy, since the 
coupling of reductions in energy use with no penalty in terms of output (the “zero-cost” ideal of the 
resource productivity enthusiasts) may not in fact be the win-win option suggested, due to induced 
effects on output and the consequent scale effect on environmental burdens. . 
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 Our work shows that energy efficiency measures would generally be expected to generate a less than 
proportional fall in energy use (rebound). Our own view is that even the presence of backfire would 
not undermine the case for energy efficiency policy: although it does imply that environmental 
benefits cannot be guaranteed by such policies alone. Rebound implies that environmental 
improvements will not be as great as the initial percentage fall in energy use per unit output. However, 
the extent of rebound is ultimately an empirical issue. Our own empirical analysis suggests the 
likelihood of significant rebound effects in response to system-wide changes in energy efficiency (of 
the order of 40%) for the UK as a whole, although this does depend on the precise value of elasticities 
that govern the ease of substitutability of energy for other inputs. However, there is also typically an 
accompanying stimulus to economic activity. A clear policy implication is thus that: (i) in general, the 
coordination of energy policies would be beneficial and (ii) that an increased energy tax may be 
required to be implemented alongside the energy efficiency improvement.  
 
Our results show some sensitivity of the rebound effect to changes in the parameter values for the 
elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy intermediates; for the elasticity of demand 
for energy, electricity and non-energy sectors and to the costs of policies and the behaviour of the 
labour market. However, it is difficult to see how energy policy could in itself do much to change 
these parameters in the “right” direction. Indeed, improvement of information flows and reduction of 
transactions costs would be likely to increase effective elasticities, not reduce them. 
 
Our sensitivity analysis reveals the importance of the treatment of the government budget, at least for 
the economic impact of energy efficiency improvements, if not for the scale of rebound effects. In 
general environmental impacts will depend crucially on precisely how the government budget is 
closed. For example, cutting other environmental taxes would increase overall environmental burdens, 
and this is also true for cuts in income tax (e.g. if consumer expenditure is more energy-intensive than 
government expenditure). Also, higher government spending on R&D in renewable technology, or on 
infrastructure for hydrogen vehicles or on low-emission trains, would reduce the environmental 
rebound associated with energy efficiency gains, driving down CO2 emissions over time. If off-setting 
increases in government spending impact on environmental indicators other than those relevant to 
climate policy (e.g. impacts on water quality), then we need to know how substitutable gains in one 
environmental target area are for losses in another. 
 
Finally, energy efficiency improvements are likely to be the result of conscious R&D investments, 
rather than emerging exogenously. How government behaves in terms of incentivising endogenous 
technological change for energy-using processes will be crucial. That government has a role in doing 
this comes from a recognition of the public good aspects of technological change. 
 
It is important that, where substantial across-the-board energy efficiency improvements are being 
pursued, future evaluation work adopts an approach which allows the system-wide effects of 
efficiency improvements to be assessed. Such an approach also allows the analysis to reflect the 
operation of a stimulus to GDP, employment and incomes resulting directly from the increase in 
energy efficiency. A full Cost Benefit Analysis of efficiency effects would need to take these knock-
on macro effects into account.  
 
One important point in evaluating the macroeconomic impacts of a resource productivity change is to 
know whether it is a one-off shock, or a continuous process. While a one-off shock is capable of 
having impacts on GDP (moving it to a new equilibrium over time), only a continuous process of 
improvement will change the growth rate of the economy.  
 
It is also desirable that, in the case of the use of time series or cross-section data to analyse the effects 
of changes in energy efficiency, that a distinction be drawn between price-induced change and 
technology-induced change.  
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 1. Introduction and background 
 
Would a more efficient use of energy resources reduce the environmental burden of economic 
activity?  This question has become prominent in recent years as governments across the world have 
implemented energy efficiency programs.  In the UK, the Cabinet Office (2001) set out the aims for 
resource productivity to reduce the impact of economic activity on the environment. The ultimate aim 
is to “decouple” economic activity from environmental damage. For Scotland, the First Minister 
stated “being more efficient with our resources will make our businesses more competitive and our 
economy more productive” (DEFRA, 2005, p1).  The Carbon Trust (2003) also recently backed this 
view, reporting “as energy efficiency measures to reduce carbon emissions today are cheaper than 
renewable energy, Government could pursue its environmental goal at lowest cost by focusing on 
energy efficiency”. 
 
Internationally, the efficient use of resources has seen a growing role in policy making.  The 
recently signed U.S. Energy Policy Act 2005 affords a central role to energy efficiency, and there are 
influential groups advocating the use of energy efficiency programs (such as the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development and the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy).  
The “Factor 10 Club” (Schutz and Welfens, 2000, p15) argues “within one generation, nations can 
achieve a ten-fold efficiency increase concerning the use of energy, natural resources and other 
materials”.  
 
Improvements in resource productivity have been suggested as both a measure of progress 
towards sustainable development and as a means of achieving sustainability (Cabinet Office, 2001). 
The popular interpretation of resource productivity is "doing more with less": that is, of reducing the 
material or energy requirements of economic activity. As we note below, there are many possible 
interpretations of resource productivity. However, the presumption of the “conventional wisdom” that 
underlies current policy initiatives is that improving resource productivity will lower the burdens on 
the environment. In fact, there has been an extensive debate in the energy economics/ policy literature 
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on the impact of improvements in energy efficiency in particular. This focuses on the notion of 
“rebound” effects, according to which the expected beneficial impacts on energy intensities are 
partially, or possibly even more than wholly in the case of “backfire”, offset as a consequence of the 
economic system’s responses to energy efficiency stimuli. The “Khazoom-Brookes postulate” 
(Saunders, 1992) asserts that improvements in energy efficiency can actually stimulate the demand for 
energy, thereby nullifying the anticipated environmental benefits of such changes.   
 
There is growing discussion in the policy community of the empirical importance of the 
rebound effect.  A very recent development is a House of Lords (2005) report that consulted on the 
importance of rebound for the effectiveness of UK energy efficiency policy.  It notes that the way in 
which these impacts manifest themselves at the system-wide level are less well-known than the 
micro-economic effects. 
 
Absolute reductions in energy consumption are thus possible at the 
microeconomic level.  However, this does not mean than an analogy can be made 
with macroeconomic effects.  Apart from anything else, the substitution effects 
observable at the macroeconomic level cannot be replicated by households, 
where demand for a range of goods is relatively inelastic… a business on the 
other hand, could respond to cheaper energy by deliberately increasing 
consumption – using a more energy intensive process, which would allow 
savings to be made elsewhere, for instance in manpower (House of Lords, 2005, 
p29.) 
 
These conclusions mark the first time, to our knowledge, that UK policy circles have acknowledged 
that energy efficiency improvements alone might not deliver the expected environmental effects. 
Again: 
 
“the ‘Khazzoom-Brookes postulate’, while not proven, offers at least a plausible 
explanation of why in recent years improvements in ‘energy intensity’ at the 
macroeconomic level have stubbornly refused to be translated into reductions in 
overall energy demand.  The Government have so far failed to engage with this 
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fundamental issue, appearing to rely instead on an analogy between micro- and 
macroeconomic effects”. (House of Lords, 2005, p102.) 
 
In this report we build upon our earlier analysis in Hanley et al (2005, 2006) to explore the 
conditions under which the notion that energy efficiency is environment-enhancing would be 
expected to hold theoretically, and present some empirical evidence from an energy-economy-
environment computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the UK economy. In Section 2 we 
define resource productivity, summarise previous theoretical discussions and sketch our own analysis 
of the likely system-wide ramifications of a stimulus to energy efficiency. While we conclude, as have 
many others (e.g. Saunders, 2000b), that the extent of rebound and backfire is an empirical issue, the 
review of theory serves to clarify the key determinants of the scale of such effects and the nature of 
the evidence that would be required to resolve the debate. In Section 3 we provide a brief summary of 
existing evidence. In Section 4 we summarise the key features of our energy-economy-environment 
computable general equilibrium model of the UK, UKENVI. We present the results of simulating an 
across the board stimulus to energy efficiency in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss the implications 
of rebound effects for energy policies. Section 7 is a brief conclusion. We provide a simplified 
summary of the structure of UKENVI in Appendix 1, discuss the construction of the model’s database 
in Appendix 2. 
  
2. Theoretical analysis of resource productivity stimuli and rebound effects 
  
We begin by providing some background that appears to underlie the “conventional wisdom” 
that resource efficiency increases reduce resource use. We then briefly summarise previous theoretical 
analyses of rebound and backfire effects. Finally, we provide sketch of our own theoretical analysis of 
these effects. Overall, our view is that previous studies, even those most closely associated with the 
view that the macroeconomic rebound effect may be substantial, tend to understate the potential scope 
for rebound and backfire effects in open economies such as the UK. However, theoretical analysis 
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alone can only hope to identify the conditions under which such effects are likely to arise: the issue of 
the scale of such effects is inherently an empirical one. 
 
Background 
 
As de Bruyn and Opschor (1997) have noted, the intensity with which economies utilise 
material and energy resources changes over time. Trends of both "dematerialisation" and 
"rematerialisation" have been noted by them, as by other authors (eg Young and Sachs, 1995). 
Perhaps based on these empirical observations, an argument has emerged in favour of deliberately 
improving resource productivity as a part of sustainable development policy (Weizsacker et al, 1997) 
and as a way of reducing the environmental impacts of economic activity (Chadwick, 1998). This 
academic literature has had an impact on the policy community, with increasing resource productivity 
being promoted by several governments and international agencies (Nordic Council of Ministers, 
1999; Cabinet Office, 2001; EEA, 1999). Resource productivity measures have also emerged as 
official indicators of sustainability (DETR, 1999). Rather large improvements in resource productivity 
have been suggested as being both possible and desirable, in the case of both "factor four" and "factor 
ten" arguments (Weizsacker et al, 1997). For example, the UK has set targets of a 20% improvement 
in energy efficiency by 2010, with a further 20% improvement by 2020. 
 
 How is resource productivity defined however? Pearce (2001) suggests as the ratio of output 
to the resource input (Q/R), where R may be materials or energy input. Q may be interpreted as GDP, 
thus Q/R becomes materials or energy efficiency (output per unit of materials/ energy input). Why 
may these measures be of interest? The reasons lie in the motivation for society wishing to improve 
resource productivity, which according to Pearce (op cit) are1: 
(a) to conserve scarce energy and materials resources 
(b) to conserve the natural environments which act as the receiving 'sinks' for resources when 
they are converted to wastes 
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(c) to increase profitability in firms - provided the costs of improving resource productivity are 
not greater than the cost savings, profits will rise. 
 
Pearce claims that (b) is the most important reason, since markets will in general handle both (a) 
and (c), whilst environmental impacts are typically non-market, and so cannot be optimally dealt with 
by the market, although it is important to remember that emissions are not necessarily a good proxy 
for environmental damage. In the UK, government has stated that (b) is the most important motivation 
(eg DTI, 2002). Interestingly, (c) is put forward by many authors as a reason why improving resource 
productivity is both good for the environment and good for industry: see Fischer-Kowalski et al, 1997 
for evidence, and WBCSD (2000) for advocacy on this point.  
  
Many recent analyses take the form of growth accounting exercises (eg Pearce, 2001) 
organised around an identity, such as that expressed in equation 1: 
 
(1) 
ZP
R
B
  
 
Where: R  is resource use;  is population; P Z  is output per head ( ) and /Y P B is resource 
productivity ( )./Y R
2
 Taking logs and totally differentiating with respect to time yields: 
 
(2) r z p b   $$ $$  
 
where the lower case, dot notation denotes proportionate rates of change, so that, for 
example,
1 dp
p
p dt
 $  (e.g. Hanley et al, 2006). This expression is taken to be a useful framework 
for thinking about resource productivity issues. For example, Pearce (2001) notes that to avoid 
increasing resource use, resource productivity growth has to be sufficient to exceed the sum of growth 
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in per capita income and population. That is to say, 

b  is expected to rise due to increases in resource 
productivity – i.e. increases in output per unit of resource use.  
 
However, this analysis is problematic in a number of respects. First, it ignores the fact that 

b  
may rise for reasons other than increased resource productivity. For example, there may be 
substitution in favour of other inputs in response to alternative policy instruments such as taxes on 
resource use or physical controls, or other unrelated changes in input use. It also tends to equate 
changes in resource productivity, as defined in equation (1), with changes in resource efficiency, that 
is technological changes that allow greater output per unit of resource input. Therefore there is a 
failure to recognise that 

b  may actually fall with increased resource efficiency, due to increased 
competitiveness in energy-intensive sectors. As the price of energy falls, in efficiency units, there may 
be substitution in favour of energy in local production and increased consumption demand for the 
outputs of energy-intensive sectors. Moreover,  and  are not exogenous variables. Any positive 
change in efficiency will increase competitiveness and therefore, potentially, output per head and, in 
general, population. However, while induced changes in the latter prove important for analyses of 
regional economies (Hanley et al, 2005), we assume that they are at most of second order importance 
for the UK as a whole, and we abstract from them in what follows. 

y

p
 
Thus, while discussions based around equation (2) (or one of its variants) are not without 
interest, it is important to note that these are incapable of adequately identifying the implications of an 
increase in resource productivity. For this we require a theory of the system-wide links between 
resource productivity stimuli and output. We begin with a brief summary of past analyses of rebound 
and backfire effects. 
 
Past theoretical analyses of macroeconomic rebound effects 
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It is instructive to provide a brief account of the literature on what has come to be known as 
the macroeconomic rebound effect, which focuses on the Khazoom-Brookes postulate. The literature 
is couched in terms of energy efficiency, but the principles apply to other forms of resource 
productivity. In fact, both Khazoom (1980) and Brookes (1990) acknowledge their intellectual 
indebtedness to Jevons (1865) as being the originator of the basic idea that energy efficiency 
improvements could lead to an increase in energy demand. Jevons (1865), concentrated on the 
possible exhaustion of a finite natural resource, namely coal.  While Jevons’ (1865) analysis focuses 
on a single energy source, there can be little doubt of the system-wide importance of coal in fuelling 
the industrial revolution, and so changes in the efficiency of its use undoubtedly had macroeconomic 
effects. While largely an empirical study, in a key passage, examining the argument that a more 
efficient use of coal would prolong its life, Jevons (1865, p140) argues, “it is wholly a confusion of 
ideas to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to a diminished consumption.  The very 
contrary is the truth.” Clearly Jevons (1865) rejected the argument that a more efficient use of coal 
would necessarily reduce the demand for coal.  He argued  (1865, p141)  “it is the very economy of its 
use which leads to its extensive consumption.  It has been so in the past, and it will be so in the 
future”.  Indeed, Jevons (1865, p141-142) is clear on the causes of this counter-intuitive result. 
 
The number of tons used in any branch of industry is the product of the number 
of separate works, and the average number of tons consumed in each.  Now, if 
the quantity of coal used in a blast-furnace, for instance, be diminished in 
comparison with the yield, the profits of the trade will increase, new capital will 
be attracted, the price pig-iron will fall, but the demand for it increase; and 
eventually the greater number of furnaces will more than make up for the 
diminished consumption of each. 
 
The modern “conventional wisdom” on efficiency seems to have neglected Jevons’ insight 
from over one hundred years ago. The same arguments, namely that increased efficiency can reduce 
our dependence on oil (as criticised by Brookes, 1978) or limit environmental impacts (Pearce, 2001) 
are being made once again.  However, the resurgence of these arguments has been questioned in the 
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economic and environmental literature.  This critical work supports the ideas of Jevons with modern 
economic tools of analysis.  Wilhite and Norgard (2004, p992) for instance, argue “the policy and the 
research at the centre of the discourse on energy sustainability suffer from a self-deception, which 
resolves around the equation of ‘efficiency’ with ‘reduction’”. 
 
While Jevons (1865) effectively argues for backfire as Alcott (2005) notes, our own view is 
that there is fact nothing inevitable about backfire (though we do believe that zero rebound is virtually 
inconceivable). Modern theory has helped to identify the conditions that are likely to facilitate 
significant rebound and even backfire. Saunders’ (1992, 2000a,b) analyses of rebound and backfire 
effects provide probably the best known, and most formal, analyses of the issues from an explicitly 
macroeconomic perspective. Khazzoom’s (1980) work is partial equilibrium in nature, taking 
aggregate incomes and output as given. Brookes (1990) began the development of the argument in a 
macroeconomic context, and Saunders’ analyses extend this. (The subsequent interchange between 
Grubb (1990, 1992) and Brookes (1992,1993) centred mainly on the likely scale of rebound effects so 
we consider it briefly in our discussion of empirical evidence, but see also below.) Saunders’ 
(1992,2000a,b) analyses the impact of energy efficiency changes using a model of neoclassical 
growth, and these contributions have come to be widely regarded as offering the strongest theoretical 
support for macroeconomic rebound and backfire effects. While Howarth’s (1997) challenge to 
Saunders’ (1992) support for the likelihood of significant rebound and backfire effects, namely that 
Saunders had failed to distinguish between energy and the services of energy, is regarded as 
convincing by some (e.g. Herring, 1999), it appears to us to have been effectively countered in 
Saunders (2000a), where it is shown that Howarth’s assumption of a Leontief production function for 
the production of energy services is crucial to his challenge.  
 
While our own view is that Saunders (1992, 2000a,b) adds significantly to our understanding 
of the long-run macroeconomic impacts of energy efficiency changes, we also believe that the context 
in which he chooses to analyse their impact is rather restrictive and, despite being regarded as one its 
leading advocates, inadvertently tends to understate the case for macroeconomic rebound and backfire 
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effects. In particular, it leads to an over-emphasis of the significance of the elasticity of substitution of 
energy (or energy services) for other inputs in governing the extent of rebound or backfire, an 
emphasis reflected in other contributions (e.g. Howarth, 1997). This elasticity is indeed important, and 
it is true that the greater its value, other things being equal, the greater is the likely the extent of 
rebound. However, even if it is zero, rebound and even backfire may still occur. We next turn to 
sketch our preferred theoretical analysis. 
  
System-wide impacts of an increase in resource productivity 
 
We examine the system-wide impact of improved resource productivity within a general 
equilibrium framework. Here we focus on enhanced energy efficiency, but the general approach can 
be extended to other resources. The problem is tackled by imposing energy-augmenting technical 
progress within the aggregate production structure. This has the effect of increasing energy efficiency 
but actually reduces the price of energy, measured in efficiency units: 
 
[3]  İ = 1 + Eȡ  
 
where is an efficiency unit of energy, E is one physical unit of energy and İ ȡ  is the change in 
energy efficiency. Then the price of an efficiency unit of energy is given by 
 
[4]  Eİ
p
p =
1 + ȡ  
 
The overall impact of a change in energy efficiency on the use of energy depends solely on 
the general equilibrium own-price elasticity of demand for energy. Where this is greater than unity, 
the fall in the implicit price of energy will generate an increase in expenditure on energy so that 
overall energy use would rise: substitution and output effects would dominate efficiency effects.  
 
 16
The simplicity of this result, and its significance, appear not to have been fully appreciated in 
the wider literature, although many analyses come close. This seems in part to be tied to the fact that 
the debate in the literature centres around concepts of “rebound” and “backfire”. Saunders (e.g. 
2000a) defines rebound as R, equal to unity plus the elasticity of physical energy use (1+ȘE) with 
respect to the efficiency augmentation factor (1+ȡ). In fact, it is straightforward to show that R is 
simply the (absolute value of the) elasticity of the demand for energy in efficiency units (Șİ) with 
respect to (1+ȡ). That is to say: RŁ Șİ = 1+ȘE. In turn Șİ is simply the (absolute value of the) price 
elasticity of the demand for energy in efficiency units (0 Șİ  ). In the present context rebound is 
said to occur if the demand for energy falls less than proportionally to the stimulus to energy 
efficiency. Thus zero rebound (R=0) would require the demand for efficiency units of energy to be 
unaffected by the efficiency stimulus, so that the demand for physical units of energy would decline 
equi-proportionately (ȘE = -1). This is precisely the result that occurs if Șİ = 0. Rebound is said to be 
unity (R=1) if the demand for efficiency units of energy increases by the same percentage as the 
effective price of energy falls, so that the physical quantity of energy used remains unchanged (ȘE = 
0). This result is associated with a unitary price elasticity of the demand for energy in efficiency units 
(Șİ = 1). Finally, “backfire” arises (R>1) wherever the quantity of energy demanded actually increases 
relative to its initial level in response to an energy efficiency stimulus (ȘE >0), a result that is assured 
by a price elasticity of energy demand that is greater than unity, so that the demand for efficiency 
units of energy increases more than in proportion to the fall in the effective price of these units. 
“Rebound” is nothing more than the (absolute value of the) price elasticity of demand for energy in 
efficiency units.  
 
Expressed in this way, it is comparatively straightforward to clarify a number of issues. 
Assume, for now, a small open economy that produces a single output by combing two inputs, “value-
added” (in turn produced by capital and labour) and an intermediate energy composite. This is, in fact, 
very similar to the macroeconomic production function that forms the basis of Saunders’ (2000a) 
analysis of rebound and backfire effects, except that Saunders effectively adopts a closed-economy 
neoclassical growth model. In fact, it is fairly straightforward to capture openness with a slight 
 17
modification to the demand side to recognise the price-elasticity of demand of the single ouput in this 
context. This would allow derivation of the macroeconomic, or system-wide, demand for energy as a 
“derived demand” for a factor of production in an open-economy context.  The demand for energy 
(and labour and capital) in this system “derives” solely from the demand for the country’s output 
(since we assume for simplicity that energy is consumed only as an intermediate good). In these 
circumstances, we can invoke Hicks’s (1963) laws of derived demand to identify the determinants of 
the price elasticity of demand for energy – and therefore the scale of rebound effects in this simple 
economy – given that we have established that rebound is nothing other that the absolute value of the 
price elasticity of demand in efficiency units.  
 
First, Saunders’ (2000) analysis argues that rebound and backfire are “apparently” more likely 
the greater is the elasticity of substitution of energy for other inputs (labour, capital). In fact this is one 
of Hicks’ “Rules of Derived Demand”, so the result is general in the sense that it is not dependent on 
the specific production functions considered by Saunders. As energy efficiency increases, and the 
price of an efficiency unit of energy falls, the greater the ease with which energy can be substituted 
for other factors, the greater the stimulus to energy demand.  However, the conclusion that there is 
consequently a “key policy tradeoff”, so that if this elasticity of substitution is low “one worries less 
about rebound and should incline toward programs aimed at creating new fuel-efficient technologies” 
(p446) is strictly incorrect. The problem here is that rebound, or the price elasticity of demand for 
electricity in efficiency units, does not depend only on the elasticity of substitution of energy for other 
inputs. Indeed, even if this elasticity is precisely zero, as under Leontief technology, rebound and 
indeed backfire remain perfectly feasible, if less likely. There appears to be a widespread, but 
mistaken, belief in the literature that low elasticities of substitution between energy and other inputs 
(indeed it is often asserted that this is the case for elasticities less than unity) imply that rebound must 
be small and backfire impossible.  
 
A second, and key, factor omitted by neglecting openness and the potential importance of the 
demand side of the product market is that rebound is increasing in the price elasticity of the demand 
 18
for the output into which energy is an input. This is potentially a critical determinant of the extent of 
rebound or backfire, yet its significance is perhaps not as widely recognised as it deserves to be in the 
literature. It is, of course, occasionally mentioned but typically in a microeconomic context, and often 
to be dismissed on empirical grounds (Greening et al, 2000). It is true that the significance of this 
factor is moderated by a third: energy’s share in the relevant scale variable (e.g. GDP in a KLE value-
added production function), which is typically of modest scale. For the subject economy, however, 
openness to trade may imply a highly price-elastic demand for the output produced by the economy. 
This implies that the derived demand for energy within the subject economy may also be price-elastic. 
In these circumstances an economy-specific stimulus to energy efficiency reduces the price of an 
efficiency unit of energy and the good produced, so stimulating the demand for output, resulting in 
significant rebound and perhaps backfire.  
 
Finally, the price elasticity of demand for energy will be greater the greater the elasticity of 
supplies of other factors. These elasticities are almost certain to increase with the duration of the time 
interval under consideration. Labour supplies could be increased, for example, by working longer 
hours, greater participation rates or, in a regional and even national context, through in-migration. 
Capital stocks can be augmented gradually through investment. However, such processes are likely to 
be extended, and so time may be a very important factor in governing the scale of rebound. This has, 
of course, been recognised in the literature, though not expressed in quite this way. These points all 
have echoes in the literature, but in the present context they follow very straightforwardly and 
unambiguously. 
 
Furthermore, some aspects of the debate on rebound and backfire seem curious in the current 
context. Thus the idea that rebound is an unlikely phenomenon, a view propounded by some green 
critics and by some engineers seems virtually inexplicable. The restrictiveness of the zero rebound 
(elasticity) case is immediately apparent from our more general macroeconomic analysis. For R=0, it 
would certainly not be sufficient for energy to be combined with other inputs through Leontief 
technology (zero elasticity of substitution), as some of the literature appears to suppose. The 
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requirement that the demand for energy be entirely invariant with respect to own price also requires 
that relevant goods’ demands (including international demands) be completely unresponsive to price 
changes, or energy’s share in the relevant composite be approximately zero. We have difficulty 
imagining any real-world example, especially in the context of a small open economy. Equally, it is 
clear that any notion that backfire can be ruled out on the basis of theoretical arguments is groundless. 
This is an empirical issue, dependent on the price elasticity of the system-wide demand for energy 
being greater than unity in the specific context.  
 
As with any simple theoretical analysis a number of qualifications/ extensions are appropriate, 
but none undermine the essential message that we should find neither rebound nor backfire surprising. 
First, energy is, of course, demanded as a final good and households demand it directly too for heating 
and lighting (as well as indirectly via the energy content of consumption goods). This simply creates 
other possibilities of substitution and income effects, which have been recognised by a number of 
contributors to the debate (e.g. Greening et al, 2000)  to match the output and substitution effects 
apparent on the supply side. These effects will tend to provide reinforcing arguments for rebound and 
backfire, as consumers substitute towards energy intensive goods in the face of an efficiency-induced 
fall in the relative price of energy, and real incomes rise, further stimulating the demand for normal 
goods (and therefore probably energy, both directly and indirectly). Saturation effects could certainly 
limit any tendency for the demand for energy to increase as a consequence of incorporating 
households’ behaviour directly, and it almost certainly is the case, as implied by the earlier quotation 
from the House of Lords (2005), that substitution possibilities may be more limited for households. 
Secondly, some argue that the response to energy price rises and falls is likely to be asymmetric (and 
there appears to be supporting evidence – see below), reflecting, for example, adoption of new 
technologies not easily reversible in response to energy price hikes. The argument here would be that 
the scope for rebound and backfire in response to efficiency improvements should focus on the 
elasticity with respect to price falls, which would be lower than that with respect to price rises. 
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Reference has also sometimes been made to the possible “transformational” effects of energy 
efficiency increases (e.g. Greening et al, 2000), by which we presume is meant either that technical 
change itself and/or household utility functions are themselves endogenous in the very long-run. 
While such effects could reinforce rebound effects and can, in principle, be incorporated into the 
analysis, the empirical evidence is, to our knowledge, extremely limited to date, so that calibration 
would be problematic, and we follow Greening et al (2000) in not pursuing it further here. 
 
Of course, in practice there is not one good but many, with wide variation in energy 
intensities of production and substitution and demand elasticities, introducing a wide diversity of 
relative price changes in response to energy efficiency stimuli. Furthermore, there are a range of 
energy inputs, with substitution possible among them.  These observations in themselves appear to 
militate against the use of aggregate studies given that these must be the outcome of the reactions of 
numerous transactors. In these circumstances “the” system-wide price elasticity of demand for energy 
is in fact a complex combination of a large number of structural (e.g input intensities) and behavioural 
(e.g. substitution) parameters, which in practice defy a solely analytical approach. This provides a part 
of the motivation for the CGE modelling approach that we pursue here.  
 
There is a significant and growing literature that focuses on barriers to the adoption of the 
most efficient energy technologies (e.g. Sorrell et al, 2004). And Grubb’s (1990, 1992) interchanges 
with Brookes (1990, 1992, 1993) reflect this perspective. Conventional neoclassical behavioural 
functions of the type assumed here, it is argued, fail to capture some of the significant barriers to 
penetration of new technologies, including, for example, imperfect information, the presence of some 
significant transactions costs that are neglected in the optimisation processes that underlies the 
functions. While we there is clear microeconomic evidence that such considerations matter in 
practice, they cannot be properly captured by macroeconomic approaches, except imperfectly to the 
extent that they impact on the values of the key parameters. Ultimately these contributions simply 
reinforce the main conclusion that rebound is an empirical issue, though they do suggest reasons why 
rebound and backfire may be rather less significant empirically than they otherwise would be. 
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 Undoubtedly the single most important conclusion of our analysis so far is that the extent of 
rebound and backfire effects in response to energy efficiency stimuli is always and everywhere an 
empirical issue. It is simply not possible to determine the degree of rebound and backfire from 
theoretical considerations alone, notwithstanding the claims of some contributors to the debate. In 
particular, theoretical analysis cannot rule out backfire. Nor, strictly, can theoretical considerations 
alone rule out the other limiting case, of zero rebound, that a narrow engineering approach would 
imply. However, in an open economy such as the UK it is virtually inconceivable that there would be 
no rebound effect associated with energy efficiency improvements, since this would require zero 
sensitivity to relative price changes throughout the entire system (not just Leontief production 
technology). Even if it is conceded that neoclassical economic theory tends to exaggerate the 
flexibility of the economic system by abstracting from some real-world frictions, the zero rebound 
case seems extremely unlikely to be of any empirical relevance. The restrictiveness of the conditions 
required for zero rebound does not, however, appear to be widely appreciated.  
 
Secondly, while the presence of rebound does indeed reduce the environmental gain of energy 
efficiency stimuli, and backfire more than offset it, relative to what would be expected from a narrow 
engineering perspective, this reflects the presence of an economic gain that similarly would be 
unanticipated by such a perspective. Whatever the judgment on Jevons’ (1865) overall analysis, his 
insight that dramatic improvements in the efficiency in the use of coal were a key driver of the 
industrial revolution is worthy of serious consideration. This does not, of course, imply that the 
environmental effects of rebound are unimportant, but the presence of economic gains does suggest 
the possibility, at least in principle, of devising a policy package that may yield a “double dividend”.  
 
Finally, the theoretical analysis serves to clarify the precise nature of the evidence required to 
allow assessment of the likely scale of rebound effects. We use this to inform our brief summary of 
the existing empirical evidence, which follows.  
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3. Existing empirical evidence 
 
A comprehensive review of the extant empirical evidence is well beyond the scope of this 
report and is, in any case, currently being undertaken by UKERC. (See Sorrell and Dimitopolous, 
(2005), who do note, however, that the quantity, heterogeneity and complex nature of much of the 
evidence is likely to render a full Evidence Based Policy and Practice approach impractical.) Rather, 
we attempt to provide a flavour of the evidence, and relate it to our discussion of the theoretical 
analysis. A natural starting point is to consider available evidence on the price-elasticity of the derived 
demand for energy by firms, given its likely central importance overall.  
 
Some evidence focuses on trends in energy intensities both at the micro (household and 
industry) and the macroeconomic levels (energy intensities of GDP). While these studies provide 
much useful background information (e.g. Herring, 1999; Schipper and Grubb, 2000, who judge that 
there is little evidence of significant rebound effects in IEA countries), they cannot strictly, in 
themselves, be used to resolve the extent of rebound, because of the difficulties of interpreting such 
ratios alluded to in our discussion of growth accounting approaches. (The decompositional approach 
explored by Schipper and Grubb (2000) is amenable to generalisation using input-output (IO) 
attribution methods and appropriate IO tables and social accounting matrices.)  There are so many 
influences on these ratios that are nothing to do with energy efficiency per se, that it is not possible to 
come to any firm conclusions about the likely extent of rebound. Of course, Jevons’ own (1865) 
analysis is based on a particular causal interpretation of changing coal efficiencies and industrial 
output, and equally cannot be regarded as establishing the importance of “backfire” during the 
industrial revolution. In fact, however, Schipper and Grubb (2000, p386) appear to accept the 
importance of significant macroeconomic rebound effects in this case and in others “when energy 
availability, energy efficiency, and energy costs are a significant constraint to activity and therefore 
energy use!”, a view that echoes Grubb’s (1990, 1992) earlier contributions. Their view is that 
typically in high-income, developed economies saturation effects are likely to be important in 
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governing household demands (though low income households are an exception), and energy costs 
are not a sufficiently important element in total costs to lead to an expectation of significant rebound 
effects. While moderate energy shares in output together with saturation effects (and asymmetrical 
responses to energy prices) do indeed imply that rebound would be lower than it otherwise would be, 
this is not sufficient to establish that such effects are insignificant. Furthermore, at least in principle, 
economic modelling approaches allow us to isolate the impact of energy efficiency changes on the 
economy and the environment by seeking to ensure that the ceteris paribus condition is met, so that 
all other influences on energy use indicators are controlled for. So for example, Hogan and Jorgenson 
(1991) found that energy intensity increased during the 1990s once the response to the 1970s oil price 
hikes were allowed for. 
 
There is evidence on the elasticity of substitution of energy for various other inputs, drawn 
mainly from applied econometric studies of production or cost functions. As Howarth (1997) notes 
there was quite a lot of research into this issue in the 1970s and early 1980s (Berndt and Wood, 1979). 
There seemed to be evidence of capital-energy complementarity from time series studies, but 
substitutability from cross-section studies, which Solow (1987) argued reflected problems in the 
aggregate production function approach. Howarth (1997) also refers to other research which 
concludes that there is an elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy inputs that is less 
than unity, but this does not, for reasons given in the preceding section of the report, validate his 
conclusion (on p2) that “the degree of substitution required for energy efficiency improvements to 
support increased energy uses is unlikely to arise in real-world economic systems..”.  This included a 
reference to the work of Manne and Richels (1992) who estimated an elasticity of substitution of 0.4 
between energy and value-added. Greening et al ‘s (2000) extensive survey of US work reports some 
studies that have found an elasticity of substitution greater than one (Chang, 1994; Hazilla and Kop, 
1986), but the vast majority of estimates are less than unity, and they conclude that the size of the 
rebound from substitution is “small to moderate”.  
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Bentzen (2004) considers the direct rebound effect of improvements in energy efficiency for 
U.S. manufacturing using a dynamic ordinary least squares approach.  Aggregate time series data are 
used to generate translog production function, from which factor demand equations are derived.   A 
significant rebound effect of 24 per cent for the U.S. manufacturing sector’s energy use is reported.  It 
is argued that this may be an upper bound as aggregate data are used, and that structural change will 
have an impact on energy consumption. Laitner (2000), on the other hand, tests for evidence of the 
direct rebound effect in the U.S. and finds that the macroeconomic impact is small.  His results are 
derived from assuming a simplified relationship between carbon emissions and a combination of 
GDP, energy prices and technology policy.  As such, this work takes a reference scenario for the 
change in these variables between 1998 and 2010 and compares this counterfactual to other scenarios 
where technology policy (such as an improvement in energy efficiency) is activated.   
 
Greening et al‘s (2000) review recognises the potential impact of energy efficiency 
improvements coming through improved competitiveness (the output effect), but “although there is 
some rebound effect resulting from increases in industry output, the magnitude appears to be small”. 
However, this conclusion is based on a deduction of the likely scale of effects, given an assumption of 
a unitary elasticity of market demand for output. In an open economy price elasticities of demand 
could be substantially in excess of unity (and in the limiting, “law of one price”, case approximate 
infinity). On the other hand, Berkhout et al (2000) also recognise the importance of price elasticity of 
demand, and report the results of research which suggests price elasticities of demand (mainly for the 
Netherlands) for various energy sources as significantly below unity, so that rebound ranges from 0 to 
30%. 
 
Evidence on household demands is also reviewed by Greening et al (2000), and they again 
find evidence of only moderate rebound effects, though again mainly from microeconomic studies 
with a comparatively short-term focus. Brännlund et al (2004), on the other hand, use data from the 
household consumption baskets of Swedish consumers to track how these have changed over time, 
and finds a backfire effect  - so that the rebound effect in consumption is sufficient to more than offset 
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the initial efficiency improvement, such that consumption actually increases – with a 20 per cent 
increase in energy efficiency increasing total CO2 emissions by 5 per cent. Roy (2000) uses case 
studies of households and industries in India to estimate price and income elasticities for energy 
services.  His results show that for households there is evidence of a clear rebound effect of the order 
of 50 per cent, with all the improvement in energy efficiency negated when the real income effects of 
cheaper energy are considered. 
.   
Zein-Elabdin (1997) examines the direct and secondary fuel use effect in estimating the size 
of the rebound effect that could arise from the use of more efficient wood-burning stoves in the 
Sudan.  He estimates supply and demand equations for charcoal in Khartoum over the period 1960 to 
1990.  He notes that measuring the change in fuel consumption by multiplying the change in fuel 
efficiency by the number of stoves in use merely produces an estimate of the first-round effects.  As 
Zein-Elabdin (1997, p471) writes, “by definition, improved stoves are designed to precipitate changes 
in household behaviour in relation to energy use; therefore, their long-term impact depends on these 
higher-order effects, which, if sufficiently large, could undermine this strategy”. 
 
The rebound effect in Zein-Elabdin (1997) is estimated as 
 
( log )TdC s dCG D I   
 
where is the fuel efficiency improvement from new stoves, dC G is the income elasticity, is the 
share of charcoal in the household budget, 
s
D  is the price elasticity of demand, and I  is the supply 
elasticity.  His results estimate that 42 per cent of the expected fuel efficiency gains from improved 
stoves may be lost to purchases of fuel, thus “a stove designed to cut fuelwood consumption by 30% 
will in reality achieve a reduction of 17.49% (Zein-Elabdin, 1997, p472).  His recommendations for 
the distribution of more efficient stoves are that, on the demand-side, they are focused more towards 
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areas where there is low demand elasticity, or, on the supply-side, policies are enacted to raise the 
elasticity of supply. 
 
Where the policies are designed to have impacts that are felt across all industrial sectors of the 
economy, such as efficiency-improving policies, a system-wide, macroeconomic or general 
equilibrium approach is appropriate and necessary. In their survey of the rebound effect Greening et 
al (2000) found one paper that examined the economy-wide effects of improved efficiency (Kydes, 
1997).  Greening et al (2000, p397) note, “prices in an economy will undergo numerous, and complex 
adjustments.  Only a general equilibrium analysis can predict the ultimate impact of these changes”.  
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models could thus provide a vehicle for the estimation of 
macroeconomic impact of energy efficiency policies, and provide the analysis that the House of Lords 
(2005) seeks.  A small number of CGE papers were published on this subject in the 1990s, e.g.; 
Dufournaud et al, 1994; Semboja, 1994; Kydes, 1997. However, since Greening et al’s (2000) review, 
there has been an expanding literature using CGE models to examine the system wide impacts of 
improvements in efficiency, e.g. Grepperud and Rasmussen, (2004); Glomsrød and Taoyuan, (2005); 
and our own previous analyses reported in Hanley et al, (2005, 2006).  
 
In Dufournaud et al (1994), the specific policy under consideration is the introduction of more 
efficient wood burning stoves, while for Glomsrød and Taoyuan (2005) the policy is the development 
of coal cleaning facilities, providing a higher energy content coal product.  In the case of Hanley et al 
(2005), the change is improved resource (energy) productivity across all sectors of the economy.  In 
each case, the intention of the study is to examine the system-wide consequences of the improvements 
in efficiency at the microeconomic level. The CGE analyses have typically found that the rebound 
effect cannot be ignored, and indeed, have argued that it should be considered when policy aimed at 
improving energy efficiency is formulated.   
 
In their conclusion, Glomsrød and Taoyuan (2005, p533) note “the attractive energy 
efficiency gains stimulates energy use to an extent that dominates over the initial energy saving.  This 
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rebound effect is significant and not modified through the labour market, as the increasing economic 
activity made possible by better use of energy does not make real wages go up.  The improved energy 
efficiency allows for a significant expansion of production capacity, and the economy becomes more 
energy intensive”.  To combat this effect, they suggest a joint implementation of other measures to 
complement the energy efficiency improvements, in order that there would be no bias towards higher 
energy intensive sectors. Hanley et al (2005, 2006) also examine energy efficiency using a CGE 
model. Like Glomsrød and Taoyuan (2005), their results of rebound and backfire can be tracked to the 
impact of changes in the real price of energy, brought about by increases in energy efficiency (raising 
the level of economic output which can be produced for a given level of energy inputs). Hanley et al 
(2005, 2006) find evidence of backfire, but emphasise the likely importance to this result of: the 
importance of electricity exports in the subject economy (Scotland), the regional context of the 
analysis, in particular the impact in-migration has in reinforcing rebound effects, and the assumption 
of a regional-specific (rather than UK-wide) energy efficiency stimulus. The contrast between the 
results reported in Hanley et al (2005, 2006) for Scotland and those reported here for the UK (for a 
model with a virtually identical set-up), serve to emphasise the importance of the structure of the 
economy and the values of key parameters (including demand and substitution elasticities) in 
governing the extent of rebound, a point reinforced by our sensitivity analysis below. 
 
While there is a significant literature relevant to the rebound debate generally, at present, 
there seems to be a dearth of empirical evidence for the UK. For instance, DTI (2002) notes that 
"there is little empirical evidence at the sectoral or economy-wide level" of improving resource 
productivity, and that "it is difficult to forecast changes in the environment" as a result of encouraging 
improvements in resource productivity. There is, as we have seen, a wide range of evidence relevant 
to the scale of the rebound effect available for other countries, particularly the US (e.g. Greening et al, 
2000), much of which suggests that the rebound effect is present, but is typically low-to-moderate in 
scale. However, these studies tend to be microeconomic in nature with a short-term focus, 
characteristics that may be likely to bias downwards estimates of the scale of rebound effects relevant 
to the macroeconomy. There is, therefore, a need for UK-oriented empirical work that is focussed on 
 28
the system-wide consequences of energy efficiency improvements. We next outline the structure of 
the UK CGE model that we develop to allow us to begin to explore the likely scale of the 
macroeconomic rebound effect in the UK.  
 
4. UKENVI: An energy-economy-environment CGE of the UK 
   
CGE models are now being extensively used in studies of the energy-economy-environment 
nexus at the national (e.g. Beausejour et al (1995), Bergman (1990), Conrad and Schroder (1993), 
Goulder (1998) and Lee and Roland-Holst (1997), and  Conrad (1999) provides a review) and 
regional levels (e.g. Despotakis and Fisher (1988) and Li and Rose (1995)). The popularity of CGEs 
in this context reflects their multi-sectoral nature combined with their fully specified supply-side, 
facilitating the analysis of both economic and environmental policies. Here we employ UKENVI, a 
CGE modelling framework parameterised on UK data.3 We next provide a brief description of the 
general model framework. A more formal description is given in Appendix 1.  
 
General structure 
 
UKENVI has 3 transactor groups, namely households, corporations, and government; 25 
commodities and activities, 5 of which are energy commodities/supply (see Figure 1 and Appendix 2 
for details); and two exogenous external transactors (RUK and ROW). Throughout this paper 
commodity markets are taken to be competitive. We do not explicitly model financial flows.  
 
The UKENVI framework allows a high degree of flexibility in the choice of key parameter 
values and model closures.  However, a crucial characteristic of the model is that, no matter how it is 
configured, we impose cost minimisation in production with multi-level production functions (see 
Figure 1), generally of a CES form but with Leontief and Cobb-Douglas being available as special 
cases. There are four major components of final demand: consumption, investment, government 
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expenditure and exports. Of these, real government expenditure is taken to be exogenous. 
Consumption is a linear homogeneous function of real disposable income.  Exports (and imports) are 
generally determined via an Armington link (Armington, 1969) and are therefore relative-price 
sensitive. Investment is a little more complex as we discuss below.  
 
We generally impose a single UK labour market characterised by perfect sectoral mobility. 
We consider three alternative treatments of the labour market. First, we include an exogenous labour 
supply closure, which, in effect, implies a completely wage-inelastic aggregate labour supply 
function. This is quite a common labour market closure in national CGE models, but is clearly a 
limiting case according to which the real wage adjusts continuously to ensure equality of aggregate 
labour demand and the fixed aggregate labour supply. Nonetheless it is a useful benchmark. As an 
alternative limiting case, we incorporate a real wage resistance closure, in which the real consumption 
wage is fixed and total employment changes to ensure labour market equilibrium. In effect labour 
supply is infinitely elastic (over the relevant range) at the prevailing real wage. The final case that we 
consider is  where wages are subject to a bargained real wage function (BRW) in which the real 
consumption wage is directly related to workers bargaining power, and therefore inversely to the 
unemployment rate (e.g. Minford et al, 1994). This hypothesis has received considerable support in 
the recent past from a number of authors. Here, however, we take the bargaining function from the 
econometric work reported by Layard et al (1991): 
 
[4]  s,t s s,t-1w = Į - 0.068u + 0.40w
 
where: w and u are the natural logarithms of the UK real consumption wage and the unemployment 
rate respectively, t is the time subscript and D is a calibrated parameter.4 Empirical support for this 
“wage curve” specification is now widespread (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994), and it is our 
preferred labour market closure.  
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Within each period of the multi-period simulations using UKENVI, both the total capital 
stock and its sectoral composition are fixed, and commodity markets clear continuously. Each sector's 
capital stock is updated between periods via a simple capital stock adjustment procedure, according to 
which investment equals depreciation plus some fraction of the gap between the desired and actual 
capital stock.  This process of capital accumulation is compatible with a simple theory of optimal firm 
behaviour given the assumption of quadratic adjustment costs.  Desired capital stocks are determined 
on cost-minimisation criteria and actual stocks reflect last period's stocks, adjusted for depreciation 
and gross investment. The economy is assumed initially to be in long-run equilibrium, where desired 
and actual capital stocks are equal.
5  
 
Treatment of energy inputs to production in UKENVI 
 
Figure 4.1 summarises the production structure of UKENVI. This separation of different 
types of energy and non-energy inputs in the intermediates block is in line with the general ‘KLEM’ 
(capital-labour-energy-materials) approach that is most commonly adopted in the 
energy/environmental CGE literature. There is currently no concensus on precisely where in the 
production structure energy should be introduced, for example, within the primary inputs nest, most 
commonly combining with capital (e.g. Bergman 1988, 1990), or within the intermediates nest, which 
is the approach we adopt here (e.g. Beauséjour et al, 1995).  
 
The multi-level production functions in Figure 1 are generally of constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) form, so there is input substitution in response to relative price changes, but with 
Leontief and Cobb-Douglas (CD) available as special cases. In the application reported in Section 5 
below, Leontief functions are specified at two levels of the hierarchy in each sector – the production 
of the non-oil composite and the non-energy composite – because of the presence of zeros in the base 
year data on some inputs within these composites. CES functions are specified at all other levels. 
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In view of the importance of the size of the relevant elasticities in our theoretical analysis of 
the rebound effects, and the wide variation in the estimated values of these key parameters noted in 
our discussion of existing evidence, we consider it essential to conduct sensitivity analysis of our 
results. 
 
Modelling pollution generation in UKENVI 
 
The simplest way to model pollution as a result of economic activity is through fixed 
coefficients linking pollution outputs to each sector’s output level. This approach was one of the 
earliest steps in general equilibrium economy-environment modelling, developed in Leontief’s (1970) 
environmental I-O framework. Nonetheless, it remains common in both I-O and more general CGE 
modelling e.g. Ferguson et al (2005). However, the major limitation of relating emissions to sectoral 
outputs only is that there is no scope for changes in emissions due to technical substitution within 
sectors. That is to say, if pollution coefficients are output-based and/or only pure Leontief technology 
is modelled, then the only way to reduce emissions within any sector is to reduce that sector’s output. 
In discussing this issue, Beghin et al (1995) identify three underlying components of changes in 
emissions levels over time. The first component is composition: the change in pollution induced by a 
change in the commodity composition of aggregate production (more or less dirty/clean goods). 
Secondly, technology relates to evolving cleaner technologies (which usually result in a change in the 
input mix). Finally, scale: the increase/decrease in pollution attributable to an increase in aggregate 
economic activity. 
 
 Where modelling of pollution involves simply relating emissions of pollution to sectoral outputs, 
only the composition and scale effects will be captured. The easiest way of modelling the technology 
effect will involve linking pollution emissions to production techniques through input-based pollution 
coefficients. It is useful to further split Beghin et al’s (1995) ‘Technology’ effect into two parts:  
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(a) Cleaner Technology – evolving cleaner technologies independent of the input mix (e.g. installing 
catalytic converters in cars – this would mean a change in the emissions factor applied to the 
combustion of petrol in cars). 
(b) Input substitution  - changing the input mix towards cleaner types of energy/fuel (e.g. changing 
from regular to low sulphur diesel) or towards non-energy inputs (e.g. reducing the amount of 
energy used per unit of existing capital). 
 
 Of course, there may be instances where both (a) and (b) would occur together – for example, in 
switching from oil to gas powered heating systems. However, it is useful to make the distinction 
because the manner in which (a) and (b) are captured in a CGE modelling framework differs. Input 
substitution, i.e. factor (b), will be captured endogenously in a production structure with fixed input-
pollution coefficients and appropriate possibilities for input substitutions. Such input substitutions 
would typically occur in response to a change in relative prices. However changes in technology (i.e. 
case (a) above) are likely to involve adjustment of relevant input-pollution coefficients and/or changes 
to the production structure to reflect differing technical relationships in sectors and/or particular input 
mixes where adjustments have occurred.   
 
 The present model captures input substitution by relating emissions of CO2 to the different types 
of energy use at different levels of the local energy nest in Figure 1. CO2 emissions from the use of 
imported energy inputs are captured through the use of fixed import pollution coefficients at the 
higher nests where the RUK and ROW composite commodities are determined.6 The input- and 
import-pollution coefficients are determined using data on the CO2 emissions intensity of different 
types of fuel use in the UK economy. The application of fuel-use emissions factor data is fairly 
straightforward in the case of CO2 emissions, as these are primarily dependent on fuel properties 
rather than combustion conditions and/or technology. In the environmental CGE literature, models 
that adopt an input-pollution approach have indeed tended to focus solely or primarily on CO2 
emissions (see Turner, 2002, for a review).  
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 However, modelling input-pollution relationships becomes more complex when it comes to non-
CO2 emissions. This is because non-CO2 emissions tend to be dependent not only on fuel type, but 
also combustion conditions and technology, meaning that appropriate emissions factors are likely to 
be more difficult to identify and numerous for models with a high level of sectoral detail. Thus, at this 
time we do not attempt to extend the input-pollution approach to the other five pollutants modelled 
here (sulphur dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, carbon monoxide and PM10). Instead, we continue to 
adopt the basic output-pollution method in the case of these pollutants (see equation 22 in Appendix 
1).  
  
Sustainability indicators in UKENVI 
 
A major objective of our research is to incorporate sustainability indicator variables into a 
system-wide model of the UK economy in order to track and explain the impact of policy actions (and 
other disturbances) on the UK’s progress towards sustainable development. In the first instance, we 
focus on resource productivity and pollution indicators.  
 
The main indicator of resource productivity recommended for the UK (see Pearce, 2001) is the 
ratio of output or income (Q) per unit of energy (m), where a rise in this ratio indicates an 
improvement in the sustainability of economic development. Our model incorporates two variants of 
this indicator: 
 
x Q/m (1) – GDP (£) per unit of non-electricity energy used (gas, oil or coal), measured in tonnes of 
oil equivalents 
x Q/m (2) – GDP (£) per unit of electricity used, measured in gigawatt hours 
 
Partly due to the problem of determining a common unit of measurement for different types of 
energy use, a variant on the Q/m indicator of resource productivity is the ratio of output or income (Q) 
per unit of polluting emissions (e). Again, a rise in this ratio indicates an improvement in the 
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sustainability of economic development. In the model of the UK economy used here we only link one 
pollutant, CO2, to energy use, so this indicator is defined as 
 
x Q/e – GDP (£) per tonne of CO2  emissions 
 
However, an alternative overall indicator of sustainable development7 is the inverse of this ratio. 
This is referred to as the ‘Sustainable Prosperity’ indicator and is defined as the level of CO2 
emissions divided by GDP, or the CO2 intensity of UK GDP, where a fall in this ratio indicates an 
improvement in the sustainability of economic development. Thus, we also report  
 
x Sustainable Prosperity – Total CO2  emissions (in tonnes) per £ of GDP 
 
Finally, we model two indicators identified that focus on the sustainability of energy consumption and 
production8: 
 
x Energy consumption – total use of electricity in Scotland (gigawatt hours) 
 
The broad target for the first of these is that consumption of electricity, particularly from non-
renewable sources, should decline.  
 
In terms of reducing levels of emissions of greenhouse gases, including CO2, while the UK has set 
firm targets for 20% reductions, in line with its commitments such as the Kyoto Protocol, the Scottish 
Executive has not. Instead, it has stated the intention to make an “equitable contribution” to the UK 
Kyoto target for greenhouse gas emissions (Scottish Executive, 2003, p.19).  
 
Database 
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The main database of UKENVI is a specially constructed Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the 
UK economy. This required the construction of an IO table for the UK for the year 2000, since an 
appropriate analytical IO table has not been published for the UK since 1995.  A twenty-five sector 
SAM was then developed for the UK using the IO as a major input. The sectoral aggregation 
(identified in Appendix 2) is chosen to allow a focus on sectors within which there were activities 
affected by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.   
 
The information on income transfers that is necessary to expand the IO into a SAM came from a set of 
Income-Expenditure accounts for the UK in 2000, developed on the basis of single-entry 
bookkeeping, where any item of expenditure in one account also appears as an item of income in 
another.  Five sets of income-expenditure accounts were constructed for households, corporations, 
government, capital and the external sector.  Full details on the construction of the UK IO table and 
SAM, together with some descriptive analysis, are given in Appendix 2. 
 
5. Results of the CGE simulations 
 
Simulation strategy 
 
The disturbance simulated using the UKENVI model is a 5 per cent improvement in the 
efficiency by which energy inputs are used by all production sectors.  Recall that the five energy 
sectors in UKENVI are the coal, oil, gas and renewable and non-renewable electricity.  An efficiency 
shock is introduced in the production of the local composite good. (See Figure 4.1.)  This shock is a 
one-off step change in energy efficiency, which is introduced as a composite energy augmenting type. 
This introduces a beneficial supply-side disturbance, which would be expected to lower the price of 
energy, measured in efficiency units, generally reduce the price of outputs and stimulate economic 
output. 
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Central case scenario 
 
The size of the impacts on key aggregate variables is shown in Table 5.1.  Note that the 
figures reported are percentage changes from the base year values. The economy is taken to be in 
equilibrium prior to the energy efficiency improvement and the results are best interpreted as being 
the proportionate changes over and above what would have happened without the efficiency shock.  
 
Results are for two conceptual time periods: the short and long run. In the short run, capital 
stocks are fixed at their base year values at the level of individual sectors. In the long run, capital 
stocks adjust fully to their desired sectoral values, given the efficiency shock and a fixed interest rate. 
With wage determination characterised by a wage curve, a beneficial supply-side policy, such as an 
improvement in energy efficiency, would increase national employment, reduce the unemployment 
rate and increase real wages. However, in UKENVI this tightening of the labour market does not 
stimulate in-migration. This contrasts with the corresponding Scottish model, AMOSENVI, where 
inter-regional migration plays an important expansionary factor in similar energy efficiency 
simulations. 
 
We note that the energy efficiency improvement has a positive impact on UK economic 
activity and that this is greater in the long run than in the short run. In the long run there is an increase 
of 0.17% in GDP and 0.21% in employment and exports. The expansion is lower in the short run, 
where a larger increase in consumption partially offsets a fall in exports.  
 
The energy efficiency improvements primarily increase the competitiveness of energy 
intensive sectors through a reduction in their relative price. In the long run two mechanisms drive this 
change in competitiveness. First, the increase in energy efficiency raises the production efficiency of 
energy intensive sectors by the greatest amount. Second, the production techniques used in energy 
sectors themselves are typically energy intensive, so that the price of energy tends to fall. For both 
these reasons, the price of energy-intensive sectors will experience relatively large reductions in price 
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in the long run. However, as we shall see, in the short-run, capacity issues also affect prices, 
sometimes in a dramatic way. The changes in the short-run and long-run output prices are reported in 
Figure 5.1. 
  
In the long run, although real and nominal wages rise, the increase in energy efficiency, 
together with fixed interest rates, is large enough to generate price reductions in all production sectors. 
However, there are clear sectoral differences that generally reflect the energy intensity of the sector. 
In the long run, prices in the manufacturing and service sectors show a small decrease, reflecting the 
relatively low use of energy inputs in these sectors. Within the manufacturing sectors, energy use 
generally represents a low proportion of the total value of output. This ranges from 0.79 % for 
electrical and electronics to 4.70 % for iron, steel and casting activities.  An even lower energy 
incidence is found in service sectors (both public and private) where energy inputs range from 0.47 % 
for health and social work to 1.48 % for distribution and transport.  
 
The largest impact on the price of output comes in the energy sectors themselves. This 
reflects the production techniques in these sectors.  But across the energy sectors, there is clearly a 
non-uniform response. The larges reductions in price occur in electricity production, with the price in 
the non-renewable electricity sector falling by more than the price in the renewable electricity sector. 
This reflects the heavier reliance of the non-renewable sector on energy inputs.  In the UK SAM for 
2000, the renewable and non-renewable electricity sectors purchase 41 and 52 per cent of their inputs 
from the combined five energy sectors. 
 
The division of the electricity sector between renewable and non-renewable generation used 
an experimental disaggregation provided for Scotland. This was adjusted to reflect the different 
pattern in electricity generation between the UK and Scotland (see Appendix 2).  These proportions of 
energy inputs to the total value of output seem exceptionally high, especially since within this 
percentage, electricity consumption itself appears to be a major element. 
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In the short run, fixed capital stocks mean that the marginal cost of production of value added 
is upward sloping. An increase in the demand for a sector’s value added leads, ceteris paribus, to an 
increase in the price of value added, with a corresponding rise in the capital rental rate in that sector. 
On the other hand, where the demand for a sector’s value added falls, the price will fall, as will the 
capital rental rate. 
 
One interesting short-run result is that the output price actually increases in most of the non-
energy sectors. These are the primary sector, the food and drink sector, and all the service and utility 
sectors.  These price increases can be traced to a high portion of value added to output in these sectors 
and the fact that in all these sectors there is a slight increase in both the nominal wage (Table 5.1) and 
the capital rental rate.  Therefore, in these cases the increases in factor costs are greater than the 
reduction in intermediate costs brought about by the improvement in energy efficiency. This partly 
reflects the very low proportionate energy purchases in these sectors.  
 
On the other hand, the price adjustments in the energy production sectors are quite different. 
First, both in the short and long run, energy prices fall as a result of the improvement in energy 
efficiency. Second, the price reduction in the short run is greater than in the long run. Third, these 
price changes are particularly marked for the electricity generating sectors.  
 
The long-run reduction in energy prices reflects the fact that these sectors have relatively 
energy intensive production processes, so that increased energy efficiency has a relatively powerful 
negative impact on their price. In the short run, falls in output demand in these sectors generates falls 
in the capital rental rate, such that the short-run price reductions are greater than those in the long run. 
In the electricity generating sectors there are significant falls in the price of their output (down over 
20%) in the short run. Over this time period the capital rental rates in the renewable and non-
renewable electricity generation sectors fall by 23.76% and 26.18% respectively as the demand for 
value added in these sectors decreases.  
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The short- and long-run sectoral changes in output are shown in Figure 5.2.  As would be 
expected, the increased efficiency of energy inputs has expanded the output of all non-energy sectors, 
with the increase almost always being greater in the long than in the short run. Outputs increase most 
in those non-energy sectors that have greater energy intensities, notably “iron, steel and casting” and 
“pulp and paper” where output increases in the long run by 0.67% and 0.46% respectively. 
 
On the other hand, the output of the five energy sectors falls in both the short and long run, 
and in this case the long-run reduction is greater in all long run than the short run. The large 
reductions in price in the short run go some way to offsetting the demand fall that occurs in the short 
run. However note that in both the short and long run, the reduction in output is less than the 5 per 
cent improvement in energy efficiency.   
 
Unlike the Scottish results (reported in Hanley et al, 2006), where the output of energy sectors 
in Scotland increase in the long run, the output of all energy sectors falls in UKENVI as a result of the 
improvement in energy efficiency.  One possible explanation for these differences is that in 
comparing the Scottish and UK SAM databases, although the comparable energy sectors had similar 
cost structures, in terms of their purchases of energy products and value added, the destination of their 
sales was significantly different. 
 
In particular all energy sectors in the Scottish SAM, with the exception of gas, provided more 
than 20 per cent of their total output for export, mainly to the rest of the UK (although the coal sector 
produced 9 per cent of its exports for the rest of the world).  The energy efficiency improvement in 
Scotland lowers the relative price of these energy goods, and so demand for energy goods from 
outside Scotland increases. However, in the UK SAM the energy sectors show a significantly lower 
propensity to export, with only the oil processing sector, with 29%, producing more than 2% of its 
output for export outside the UK.  The oil processing sector however, doesn’t rely on energy inputs as 
highly as the other energy sectors, and so the output of this sector falls – as would be expected under 
the “conventional wisdom” of energy efficiency improvements. 
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 A central result which can be drawn from this analysis is that rebound is recorded across all 
energy sectors.  No energy sector reduces its output by the full amount of the improvement in energy 
efficiency, although there are significant differences across sectors, including within the energy 
sectors.  Unlike in the Scottish case, there is no evidence of backfire, where the output of sectors 
actually rises following the improvement in energy efficiency.  The variation across energy sectors 
can be explained by the differences in the degree to which each sector relies upon energy inputs for 
production, the share of value added in production and the destination of output of each sector. 
 
The economic and environmental results obtained from UKENVI can be used to calculate the 
corresponding environmental indicators that can be tracked over time as the economic results change.  
In this section we report four environmental indicators. These are constructed using UKENVI data 
that links energy use to CO2 emissions.  The four environmental indicators are: 
 
x the ratio of output to energy used (Q/m), which has two versions, 
o the ratio of output (GDP) to units of non-electricity energy use 
o the ratio of output to units of electricity use 
x the ratio of output to CO2 pollutants 
x the ratio of CO2 pollutants to output (the indicator of “sustainable prosperity” for the Scottish 
Executive) 
x the total consumption of electricity in the UK (in gigawatt hours) 
 
Figure 5.3 reports results from a simulation lasting for 20 periods (years). GDP is larger in all 
periods than in the base year. Energy consumption, measured in electricity GWh, falls from the start 
and reaches its long-run equilibrium reduction of 3.15% by around period 7. Thus, there is a rebound 
effect from the 5 per cent reduction in energy efficiency of the order of 37%.  Unlike the case for 
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Scotland (Hanley et al, 2006), no backfire effect (an overall increase in energy consumption resulting 
from an improvement in energy efficiency) is identified. 
 
The Q/m indicators, relating GDP to both non-electricity and electricity energy use, increase from 
the base position: energy use is falling as GDP is rising. This implies development that is more 
sustainable: both these indicators register a positive change in the long run, with GDP divided by 
electricity units used increasing by around 3.5% while the ratio of GDP to non electricity energy units 
increases by just over 2%. 
 
Figure 5.4 shows that the initial decrease in energy consumption is matched by a corresponding 
fall in the level of CO2 emissions related to the use of energy inputs. These fall by around 2.5% 
compared to the base year level.  The rise in GDP and fall in CO2 emissions means that the 
“sustainable prosperity” indicator, the ratio of CO2 emissions to GDP, falls, while its converse ratio 
(GDP to CO2 emissions) increases by 2.82%. 
 
Sensitivity analysis around central case scenario 
 
Our central case results presented in Table 5.1 will be sensitive not just to the base year 
values in the UK SAM, but also to the choice of parameters for key variables in the UKENVI model, 
possible recycling of any additional government revenues and the cost of any energy efficiency 
improvements. In the next three subsections we outline the economic, energy and environmental 
impacts of varying these assumptions. 
 
Results of varying key elasticities 
 
To quantify the impact that changing these parameters has on the results, we perform 
sensitivity analysis. In this, we vary the key parameters that were used to derive the central case 
results.  The parameters that we would be expected to impact most strongly on the results are the 
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elasticity of substitution between both energy and non-energy intermediate inputs (the SIGMAL 
parameter), and between value added and intermediate inputs (the SIGMAD parameter).  In the 
central results, both these parameters have an elasticity of 0.3.  For sensitivity, we vary these 
parameters (independently) to 0.1 and 0.7.  Another potentially important parameter is the elasticity of 
export demand.  In the central results, this parameter was set at 2 for the non-energy and the non-
electricity energy sectors and 5 for the electricity sectors.  For sensitivity, these export demand 
elasticities are varied in a number of ways.  
 
Table 5.2 shows the long run results from varying the elasticity of substitution between 
energy and non-energy intermediate inputs and the central case scenario.  As would be expected, the 
higher the elasticity, reflecting a greater responsiveness between energy and non-energy inputs, 
results in a higher GDP impact.  Making it easier for sectors to substitute energy for non-energy 
inputs will lead to bigger price reductions. Conversely, lowering the elasticity of substitution prevents 
sectors from making this substitution, and so lessens the GDP gain.  The GDP results vary from 
0.16% in the low elasticity case to 0.18% when the elasticity of substitution is higher. 
 
Intuitively, total energy consumption and rebound effects will be sensitive to the value of this 
parameter.  We would expect that total energy consumption would decline least when it is easier to 
substitute towards the now relatively cheaper energy inputs.  The results presented in Table 5.2 show 
that total energy consumption declines by over 3.7% in the low elasticity case, while it only declines 
by 2% in the high elasticity case.  The high elasticity case produces a rebound effect of 60.1%, while, 
with low elasticities, rebound is 25.6%.  As can be seen in Figure 5.5, the fall in energy consumption 
is smallest, across all the sensitivity analysis we carry out when this elasticity of substitution between 
energy and non-energy inputs is high.  Figure 5.8 also shows that total CO2 emissions from fuel use 
are reduced from the base year level by only 1.35%. 
 
Table 5.3 shows the long-run results from varying the elasticity of substitution between value 
added and intermediate inputs. This is the point at the very top level of the production hierarchy used 
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in UKENVI (see Figure 4.1).  In the low elasticity case, it is more difficult for sectors to move away 
from the now relatively more expensive value added composite, and towards intermediate inputs 
(including the energy inputs) that have experienced a fall in their relative price as a result of the 
improvement in energy efficiency. In the high case it can be seen that increasing the ease of 
substitution towards the now cheaper intermediate inputs slightly lowers the GDP effect (from 0.17% 
to 0.15% above the base year), and produces a smaller overall effect on employment (down from 
0.21% in the central case to 0.20%).  Here, energy inputs are substituted in favour of labour and 
capital inputs. 
 
 Table 5.3 and Figure 5.5 also show that total energy consumption displays significant rebound 
effects again, which are greater (56.4%) the higher the value of the elasticity of substitution between 
value added and intermediate inputs. Rebound is only 27.5% in the low elasticity case.  Value-added 
and employment are thus inversely related to this substitution elasticity, while the extent of rebound is 
positively related, reflecting the greater degree of substitution towards energy.  The impact on GDP 
and employment are not very sensitive to the elastictity of substitution between value added and 
intermediate inputs (Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7), but the impact on CO2 emissions from fuel use 
(Figure 5.8) is sensitive.  These emissions fall by 2.96% in the low elasticity case, but only 1.86% in 
the high elasticity case.   
 
Table 5.4 shows the long run effects and the central scenario results from varying the export 
demand elasticities as suggested above. In the base case, these demand elasticities were set at 5 for the 
two electricity sectors (E), and 2 for the other energy sectors (O) and the non-energy sectors (N). To 
see the impact of varying these parameters, the 5% energy efficiency shock was repeated with three 
further scenarios: all sectors’ (E, O and N) export demand elasticities set at 2; the export demand 
elasticity set at 5 for all energy sectors (E and O) and 2 for all non-energy sectors (N); and the export 
demand elasticities across all sectors (E, O and N) set at 5. 
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As the elasticity of export demand is increased, sales to exports expand as a result of the 
greater responsiveness to the UK price reductions. However, the impact of varying these elasticities is 
fairly modest. This is primarily because those sectors that have the largest reduction in price are 
primarily the energy sectors that, in the main, do not export in the UK case. 
 
Varying this parameter appears to have little impact on the results in terms of GDP, 
employment, energy use, emissions and the estimated rebound effect.  GDP increases range from 
0.17% with all export demand elasticities set at 2, to 0.19% with all elasticities at 5.  The variation in 
total energy consumption is also small, with the rebound effect only ranging from 36.4% to 37.7%.  
This result suggests that in the specific case of the model of the UK, the elasticity of export demand 
appears to be comparatively unimportant for the overall degree of rebound in energy use, no doubt 
reflecting the current structure of the UK market.  
 
Results of enforcing government budget constraint 
 
Another potentially important feature of the central case projection is the treatment of the 
government sector. In the central case and all sensitivity simulations performed up to now, the 
improvement in energy efficiency stimulates aggregate economic output and employment.  Given 
fixed average tax rates, there will be an increase in the tax revenues of the UK government and a 
reduction in social security spending. In our central case, the government saves all of this 
improvement to its budgetary position. This increased government revenue can however be recycled 
back to the economy through enforcing an active government budget constraint (modelled in 
UKENVI as maintaining the base year ratio of government savings to GDP).   
 
In the UKENVI model the government budget constraint can be imposed in two ways. These 
have quite different economic impacts.  First, additional revenue can be used to expand general 
government expenditure, distributed across sectors using the base-year weights. Second, extra 
revenues received can be recycled back to households through reduced income tax. The long run 
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impacts of these two scenarios, plus the central case where extra revenues are not recycled, are shown 
in Table 5.5. 
 
When the additional tax revenues are recycled as extra government expenditure, this acts as 
an exogenous demand injection and stimulates GDP and employment.  The sectoral changes in output 
are focused on government sectors, as would be expected. In the second scenario however, when 
increased revenues are recycled in the form of a decreased income tax rate, there are significantly 
larger impacts. 
 
The recycling of the extra government tax revenues through changes in the rate of income tax 
can be viewed as having both supply and demand impacts.  On the demand side lowering the tax rate 
will raise take home wages, and thus will stimulate demand.  There will also be a supply-side impact 
as the labour market is characterised by a bargained real wage. A fall in the income tax rate means 
that a lower nominal wage is needed to maintain a given real take-home wage.  This makes 
substitution towards labour more attractive, which boosts employment.  This can be seen by the 
smaller increase for the nominal real wage in Table 5.5 where income tax adjusts, against when 
government expenditure changes.  The level of employment also increases significantly between these 
two results (0.26% higher than the base case when government expenditure adjust, against 0.38% 
higher when income tax rates adjust – see Figure 5.7), reflecting the impact of the relatively cheaper 
labour inputs compared to when government expenditure adjusts.  There is also a significant GDP 
impact in both cases, but especially strong when income tax rates adjust (raising GDP by 0.34% 
against 0.20% when total government expenditure adjusts). 
 
The energy and environmental results are also slightly different under these two scenarios.  
Total energy consumption actually falls by less (as compared to the central scenario) when 
government expenditure adjusts, reflecting the switch towards less energy intensive government 
demands, and increased employment in public sectors.  Total energy consumption falls by 3.17%, 
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indicating a rebound effect of some 36.7%.  When income tax rates adjust however, the demand and 
supply side impacts produce a smaller decrease in energy use, and a rebound effect of 41.8%.   
 
Results of implementing a costly energy efficiency policy 
 
Our assumption up to this point has been that energy efficiency improvements are like 
“manna from heaven” – a costless benefit. We here simulate the possibility that making gains in 
energy efficiency would result in costs borne by production sectors. We model the same 5% 
improvement in energy efficiency across all sectors, but simultaneously capture a cost to the 
efficiency of labour inputs in production.  This can be thought of as representing the additional costs 
to labour to implementing the improvement in energy efficiency. 
 
The size of the negative shock in each sector was imposed such that with no change in prices, 
the increase in costs implied by the reduced labour efficiency just equals the reduction in cost implied 
by the 5% improvement in energy efficiency. The change in labour efficiency in sector I (Ȝi) is 
estimated as: 
 0.05 ii
i
E
L
O ª º « »¬ ¼  
 
where Ei and Li are the base year expenditures on energy and labour in sector i. We consider this to be 
the upper bound of the costs of energy efficiency improvements. 
 
The aggregate results from introducing both the positive energy efficiency improvement and 
the negative shock to the production of labour inputs, are shown in the final column of Table 5.6. The 
negative efficiency shock to labour, combined with the positive energy efficiency gain, leads to a very 
small increase in total employment over the base year case, and a fall in GDP (See Figure 5.6 and 
Figure 5.7 for the dynamic path of these series). Up to now we have been assuming a costless 
improvement in energy efficiency. However, we can consider the results reported in the final column 
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of Table 5.6 to be the most extreme example of a “costly” energy efficiency improvement, in that the 
net impact is broadly cost neutral to individual industries.  We would expect actual energy efficiency 
improvements to lie somewhere between these two extremes.  
 
 The changes in energy use from the simulation of this costly energy efficiency policy are 
significantly different to most other sensitivity results carried out thus far.  Total energy consumption 
falls in the long-run by 4.132%, indicating a rebound effect of 17.4%.  Introducing significant costs to 
implementing energy efficiency improvements thus prevents a significant switch towards the output 
of more energy intensive sectors output, thus releasing a larger share of the stimulus to energy 
efficiency in the form of energy savings.  Significantly however, this smaller rebound effect is 
achieved at a cost in terms of GDP, although with a slight increase in total employment.  Total CO2 
emissions from fuel use in this scenario also fall, by 3.76%.  Thus, even when implementing energy 
efficiency improvements carries a cost, total energy reductions in CO2 emissions from fuel use do not 
fall by the 5% improvement in energy efficiency. 
 
Since the above “costly policy” simulation assumes that the improvement in energy efficiency 
is fully offset by a negative efficiency effect to labour efficiency, this can be considered to be a 
limiting case of the costs to implementing an improvement in energy efficiency.  The results of two 
further sensitivity simulations are reported in the second and third columns of Table 5.6.  In the first 
of these simulations, one-third of the cost savings from energy efficiency improvements are incurred 
as negative costs to labour efficiency, while in the second, two-thirds of these cost savings are spent 
realising the cost savings.  These are intended to be illustrative of the range of results as the cost of 
implementing the policy changes. 
 
The scale of the rebound effect is sensitive to the scale of the policy cost, showing interim 
stages of 31.3 and 24.8% rebound.  Interestingly, the GDP impact is positive (up 0.019% from the 
base year) where one-third of the efficiency impact is offset by additional labour costs. 
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 Results from different labour market closures 
  
 We know that assumptions about labour market behaviour  can have a major impact on the 
macroeconomic effects of any disturbance. In each of the simulations reported above we have 
assumed that the supply side of the labour market can be characterised by a bargained real wage 
function in which the real consumption wage is directly related to workers bargaining power, and 
inversely to the unemployment rate.  Two other specifications of the labour market, as introduced in 
Section 4, are be considered here. First, we impose an exogenous labour supply function, in which 
there is, in effect, a completely wage-inelastic aggregate labour supply function so that aggregate 
employment is effectively fixed. This is quite a common assumption in national CGEs, but seems 
unduly restrictive.  We also impose a real wage resistance closure, in which the real wage is 
exogenous at the prevailing real wage, and employment adjusts to ensure equilibrium.  These can be 
considered as two limiting cases capturing zero and infinite-elasticity of labour supply with respect to 
the real consumption wage.  
  
 The aggregate results in the short and long-run from introducing a 5% energy efficiency 
improvement are shown in Table 5.7.  In the exogenous labour supply scenario there is, as would be 
anticipated, a significant increase in real take-home wages, however there is also a small decrease in 
GDP in each time period.  Total energy consumption declines in each simulation, with rebound of 
50.6% in the short run falling to 32.9% when capital stocks have adjusted fully.  In the real wage 
resistance case, GDP rises in both the short (0.225%) and long run (0.897), and, as would be expected 
there is a substantial increase in overall employment (of over 4 times that in the central scenario).  
Total energy consumption again displays rebound in both time periods, but the reduction between the 
short run (55.3%) and the long run (51.7%) is small compared to the other sensitivity analysis results 
presented here.  As can be seen in Figure 5.5, the reduction in energy use is greatest around period 5, 
but energy use relative to the central scenario increases after this point. 
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The ratio of GDP to CO2 emissions (and its inverse) is shown for all the sensitivity analysis 
detailed above in Figures 5.9 and 5.10.  The rank order of these impacts is largely similar to that for 
the reductions in total CO2 emissions from fuel use.  Figures 5.11 and 5.12 show the changes in the 
ratio between GDP and energy (non-electricity and electricity, respectively) for the central case and 
the different sensitivity simulations. 
 
6. Policy implications 
 
Our own theoretical analysis, building on that of e.g. Saunders (2000a), implies that a 
rebound effect from an improvement in the efficiency with which energy enters the production 
functions of firms/households in an economy is to be expected from the point of view of neo-classical 
production and growth theory. Energy-augmenting technical progress causes firms to wish to use 
more energy (measured in efficiency units). This is the substitution effect, as the price of energy, in 
efficiency units, has fallen. Second, the efficiency gain increases output by reducing costs and 
stimulating competitiveness, thereby stimulating energy use. This is the output effect. This effect may 
be especially noticed in highly-open economies, where energy intensive goods are exported, since 
international competitiveness improves.  Third, in a multi-sectoral world, a composition effect occurs 
whereby products which are relatively energy-intensive in production fall in cost relative to those 
which are less-energy intensive. These three effects operate throughout the domestic economy, and 
mean that the reduction in aggregate fuel use, and thus the improvement in Y/m type measures, is 
likely to be less than that which we would predict from the simple improvement in technical 
efficiency (rebound) and may be strong enough to overwhelm this simple effect, pushing our resource 
productivity and sustainability indicators in the wrong direction (backfire). The only kind of economy 
where rebound would be unexpected is one in which all demands, as well as technologies take the 
Leontief form, so that there is no system-wide sensitivity to relative price changes. This is a limiting 
case that we cannot conceive of any real world economy conforming to. 
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Rebound and backfire are of considerable potential relevance to climate change policy, since 
the coupling of reductions in energy use with no penalty in terms of output (the “zero-cost” ideal of 
the resource productivity enthusiasts) may not in fact be the win-win option suggested, due to induced 
effects on output and the consequent scale effect on environmental burdens. Rebound does 
undoubtedly imply that the environmental gain generated by an improvement in energy efficiency is 
less than a simple engineering approach (which embodies zero rebound) would imply. However, it is 
important to appreciate that this reflects the presence of an economic gain that would be similarly 
unrecognised by a simple engineering approach. The presence of such economic gains when rebound 
and backfire are present at least suggests the potential for a welfare-improving policy adjustment. 
However, without such an adjustment, rebound and backfire do imply a fall in environmental quality 
relative to the zero rebound engineering case.  
 
The rebound effect is therefore something that policy makers should be aware of, in terms of 
both the design of energy policy, and in its evaluation. We now discuss some issues related to these 
two contexts. 
 
Issues Arising for the Design of Energy Policy 
 
Our work shows that energy efficiency measures would generally be expected to generate a 
less than proportional fall in energy use (rebound), and may actually stimulate its use (backfire). Our 
own view is that even the presence of backfire does not undermine the case for energy efficiency 
policy: although it does imply that environmental benefits cannot be guaranteed by such policies 
alone. Rebound implies that environmental improvements will not be as great as the initial percentage 
fall in energy use per unit output. However, the extent of rebound is ultimately an empirical issue. Our 
own empirical analysis suggests the likelihood of significant rebound effects in response to system-
wide changes in energy efficiency (of the order of 40%) for the UK as a whole.  However, there is an 
accompanying stimulus to economic activity. A clear policy implication is thus that: (i) in general, the 
coordination of energy policies would be beneficial and (ii) that an increased energy tax may be 
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required to be implemented alongside the energy efficiency improvement. Roy (2000) notes this in the 
context of a developing country (India), but it is also relevant to the current context. This implies a 
need for the government to track energy efficiency changes for every sector of the economy. 
 
Our results show some sensitivity of the rebound effect to changes in the parameter values for 
the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy intermediates; and for the elasticity of 
demand for energy, electricity and non-energy sectors. However, it is difficult to see how energy 
policy could in itself do much to change these parameters in the “right” direction. Substitution 
possibilities at the general equilibrium level depend on the complex interaction over time of 
technological production conditions, preferences and prices – and so it would be hard for government 
policy to try to bring about particular changes in these substitution possibilities. It would, in any case, 
be a rather odd policy that sought to reduce flexibility of response in an economy, which is another 
way of thinking about substitution elasticities. Indeed, improvement of information flows and 
reduction of transactions costs would be likely to increase effective elasticities, not reduce them. 
 
We also note that in our simulations, the energy efficiency effect boosts government 
revenues, since these are positively correlated with GDP and income. If the government wishes the 
energy efficiency improvement to be revenue-neutral, then it can either recycle government revenues 
through increased expenditure or reduce average tax rates. In our simulations, a general stimulus to 
government expenditure or a reduction in the average income tax rate both stimulate the economy, but 
by more in the latter case because of the strength of beneficial supply side impacts. The overall 
rebound effect is hardly affected by the recycling through increased expenditures, but is slightly 
increased in the other case due to the consumption stimulus.  In general environmental impacts will 
depend crucially on precisely how the government budget is closed. For example, cutting other 
environmental taxes would increase overall environmental burdens, and this is also be true for cuts in 
income tax (e.g. if consumer expenditure is more energy-intensive than government expenditure). 
Higher government spending on R&D in renewable technology, or on infrastructure for hydrogen 
vehicles or on low-emission trains, would reduce the environmental rebound associated with energy 
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efficiency gains, driving down CO2 emissions over time. If off-setting increases in government 
spending impact on environmental indicators other than those relevant to climate policy (e.g. impacts 
on water quality), then we need to know how substitutable gains in one environmental target area are 
for losses in another. 
 
Finally, energy efficiency improvements are likely to be the result of conscious R&D 
investments, rather than emerging exogenously. How government behaves in terms of incentivising 
endogenous technological change for energy-using processes will be crucial. That government has a 
role in doing this comes from a recognition of the public good aspects of technological change. 
 
Evaluation issues for energy policy 
 
Given what has been presented above, it is important that, where substantial across-the-board 
energy efficiency improvements are being pursued, future evaluation work of adopts an approach 
which allows the system-wide effects of efficiency improvements to be assessed. This should include 
a comprehensive linkage of economic activity in both the production and consumption sectors with 
environmental impacts such as changes in emissions of main pollutants. Changes in environmental 
impacts will come about both directly, through a reduction in energy use per unit of output, but also 
indirectly in terms of substitution, output and composition effects, as noted above. For example, the 
competitiveness boost to GDP could result in rising levels of conventional air pollutants such as TSP 
due to a rise in road freight traffic or air travel. The system used should also allow the analyst to 
analyse the effects on sustainability indicators such as the GDP/CO2 ratio in both the short run and 
longer term. 
 
Such an approach also allows the analysis to reflect the operation of a stimulus to GDP, 
employment and incomes resulting directly from the increase in energy efficiency. A full Cost Benefit 
Analysis of efficiency effects would need to take these knock-on macro effects into account. The 
analysis should also be undertaken at fairly disaggregated level, since rebound effects have been 
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found with very different magnitudes for different sectors (for example, Grepperud and Rasmussen 
(2004) find large effects in manufacturing, but little effects in other sectors of the Norwegian 
economy, whilst in their study the rebound effect was dramatically different in metal manufacturing 
compared to pulp and paper manufacture). 
 
One important point in evaluating the macroeconomic impacts of a resource productivity 
change is to know whether it is a one-off shock, or a continuous process. While a one-off shock is 
capable of having impacts on GDP (moving it to a new equilibrium over time), only a continuous 
process of improvement will change the growth rate of the economy. Changing the growth rate clearly 
implies a much bigger economic benefit or cost than a change in equilibrium output. 
 
Another key question to be asked in monitoring the effects of energy efficiency improvements 
is whether the productivity of other inputs has been changed by the energy efficiency shock. Saunders 
(2000a) gives the example of steel making in the US, where energy efficiency improvements have 
also resulted in an increase in both labour productivity and capital productivity. This could in turn 
increase output in other sectors, which reinforces the rebound effect as it pulls up energy demand 
economy-wide. 
 
CGE modelling makes it simpler to evaluate the net impacts of energy, climate or technology 
policy on energy efficiency since it makes very clear what the “counter-factual” is. This counter-
factual is the base-line run of the model without the change in energy efficiency. All changes in 
pollution, output, and employment which are observed from the technology shock are then measured 
relative to this baseline. This makes the marginal effects of technology change clear. However, 
evaluating the same policy using time series or cross-sectional statistical data requires us to be able to 
identify the counter-factual by appropriate statistical control. This may be much harder, and therefore 
more likely to risk confusing the actual drivers of changes in resource use and pollution. Of course, 
results are conditional upon model structure and the context of its implementation. The contrast 
between the “backfire” apparent in our application to Scotland and the “rebound” effect we find in the 
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UK emphasises the importance of this, with Scotland being more open, in terms of price elasticities of 
demand and the importance of migration flows and it being a significant net exporter of electricity. 
 
It is also desirable that, in the case of the use of time series or cross-section data to analyse the 
effects of changes in energy efficiency, that a distinction be drawn between price-induced change and 
technology-induced change. The US economy underwent many changes as a result of the real oil 
price increases of the early 1970s in terms of how it used energy: however, price-induced efficiency 
change comes at a macro cost (eg higher inflation, or lower output). Technology driven energy 
efficiency comes, in principle, at no cost to the economy, and can even (in fact, is likely to) result in 
higher output. Distinguishing between these two drivers is important, as Hogan and Jorgenson (1991) 
have argued, especially in the context of climate change policy.  
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this report we explore the impact of improvements in resource productivity both 
theoretically and empirically using a flexible, energy-economy-environment CGE framework.  We 
have argued that predicting the environmental impacts of significant improvements in resource 
productivity requires this general equilibrium approach, since we would expect such improvements to 
generate important system-wide output and substitution effects that tend to increase resource use, and 
act as countervailing influences to the direct effects of being able to “produce more with less”. We 
sought to clarify the theoretical literature on rebound and backfire effects according to which energy 
efficiency enhancement may be partially, or even completely, ineffective in reducing energy 
consumption. In the present case, we find evidence of a significant rebound in the UK economy (of 
slightly less than 40% in the central case).  The extent of rebound varies, as we would expect, with the 
substitution and demand elasticities within the system, and, in particular, increase as it becomes easier 
to substitute energy for other inputs.  
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  The presence of rebound does, of course, imply a smaller environmental gain from energy 
efficiency improvements than would be implied by a simple engineering approach. But equally, this 
reflects the presence of an economic gain to that the simple engineering approach would not identify. 
The stimulus to activity improves tax revenues, which may be recycled to stimulate government 
expenditure or reduce the average tax rate. The economic gain is increased in both cases, though more 
so when the tax rate is adjusted, but the extent of rebound also increases slightly in this case. While 
these results are not what advocates of enhancing resource productivity would necessarily anticipate, 
or wish for, it is potentially important for the appropriate conduct of energy policy.  
 
Two important caveats are, however, in order. First, our results are, of course, conditional 
upon the model’s structure and the values of key parameters, which are not typically estimated. Our 
sensitivity analysis in the UK context, however, suggests that backfire is unlikely even with very high 
substitution and demand elasticities. Nonetheless, the importance of this point is very clearly apparent 
from a comparison of the results we obtained from Scotland with those we obtained for the UK, using 
a model of virtually identical broad structure. Secondly, the household demand side of the system is 
comparatively inflexible with the notable exception of transactors’ responses to trade flows. This 
reflects a more general presumption of limited household substitution possibilities. 
 
We believe that the key point that this report makes is an interesting one: focussing on 
improvements in resource productivity as a keystone of sustainability policy may produce undesirable 
impacts in terms of pollution generated within particular regions. Our results also provide a cautionary 
note on the potentially crucial importance of adopting a system-wide framework to explore the impact 
of policy initiatives (although the efficiency stimulus that we analyse here is taken to be exogenous). 
Policies may have important unintended effects, which can mitigate their efficacy in achieving 
particular objectives.  
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We end by noting that we do not regard our analysis as providing a damning critique of 
policies designed to enhance energy efficiency, as advocacy of the potential importance of significant 
rebound and backfire effects appears typically to be interpreted. We adopted this position even in 
respect of our findings of backfire in the Scottish case. (Such policies would, though, have to be 
modelled explicitly if they are to be properly evaluated - something we intend to pursue in future 
research - and are not, of course, captured by the exogenous technical change that is the focus of this 
paper, and of many others in this literature.) Rather, our analysis serves to emphasise that such 
policies certainly cannot, in general, be relied upon on their own to deliver reductions even in the 
energy intensity of production, let alone to secure a fall in the absolute level of pollutants of the type 
that is required, for example, by the Kyoto agreement for greenhouse gasses. However, the UK 
evidence suggests that energy efficiency stimuli do have a beneficial impact in reducing energy 
consumption to the extent of more than 60% of any efficiency gain. 
 
Improvements in energy efficiency do create the potential for energy taxes to be levied 
without generating any of the adverse effects on economic activity that would otherwise be expected, 
particularly in the absence of revenue recycling. In this sense we would fully endorse Birol’s and 
Keppler’s (2000) view, that technology and relative price policies should be regarded as 
complementary. The appropriate combination of energy taxes (especially with revenue recycling to 
reduce taxes on employment) and energy efficiency stimuli, offer the potential of a genuine “double 
dividend” of simultaneous economic and environmental gain. However, while these potential gains 
are available in principle wherever energy efficiency is enhanced, their realisation necessitates 
conscious and coherent co-ordination of energy policies. 
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Figure 4.1: Production structure of each sector i in the 25 sector/commodity UKENVI 
framework 
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Table 5.1 The aggregate impact of a 5% increase in energy efficiency in all production sectors 
(percentage changes from the base year) 
 Short-run Long-run 
GDP (income measure) 0.105 0.168
Consumption 0.365 0.342
Investment 0.062 0.135
Exports -0.027 0.214
Imports -0.226 -0.210
 
Nominal before tax wage 0.010 0.069
Real take-home consumption wage 0.280 0.300
Consumer price index -0.269 -0.230
 
Total employment 0.195 0.208
Unemployment rate (%) -2.441 -2.612
Total population 0.000 0.000
 
Total energy consumption (in GWh) -2.349 -3.149
Rebound effect (%) 53.02 37.02
 
 
Figure 5.1 The change in the price of output from a 5% improvement in energy efficiency 
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Figure 5.2: Change in sectoral output from a 5% improvement in energy efficiency 
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Figure 5.3 Impact on Q/m, GDP and energy consumption indicators from a 5% increase in energy 
efficiency in the UK 
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Figure 5.4 Impact on environmental indicators in response to a 5 per cent increase in energy 
efficiency in the UK 
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Table 5.2 Impact of changing elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy intermediate 
inputs (the SIGMAL parameter) (percentage changes from base year) 
 Low (0.1) Central (0.3) High (0.7) 
GDP (income measure) 0.162 0.168 0.181 
Consumption 0.337 0.342 0.351 
Investment 0.119 0.135 0.167 
Exports 0.209 0.214 0.239 
Imports -0.209 -0.210 -0.210 
  
Nominal before tax wage 0.076 0.069 0.054 
Real take-home consumption wage 0.302 0.300 0.295 
Consumer price index -0.225 -0.230 -0.240 
  
Total employment 0.210 0.208 0.205 
Unemployment rate (%) -2.631 -2.612 -2.574 
Total population 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
Total energy consumption (in GWh) -3.720 -3.149 -1.993 
Rebound effect (%) 25.6 37.0 60.1 
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Table 5.3 Impact of changing the elasticity of substitution between value added and intermediate 
inputs (the SIGMAD parameter) (percentage changes from base year) 
 Low (0.1) Central (0.3) High (0.7) 
GDP (income measure) 0.177 0.168 0.150 
Consumption 0.350 0.342 0.326 
Investment 0.150 0.135 0.103 
Exports 0.198 0.214 0.258 
Imports -0.215 -0.210 -0.199 
  
Nominal before tax wage 0.086 0.069 0.037 
Real take-home consumption wage 0.305 0.300 0.289 
Consumer price index -0.218 -0.230 -0.252 
  
Total employment 0.212 0.208 0.201 
Unemployment rate (%) -2.658 -2.612 -2.525 
Total population 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
Total energy consumption (in GWh) -3.625 -3.149 -2.181 
Rebound effect (%) 27.5 37.0 56.4 
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Table 5.4 Impact of changing the export demand elasticity (the RHOUK AND RHOW parameters) 
(percentage changes from base year) 
Export demand elasticities for 
sectors* 
E=5 
O=2 
N=2 
E=2 
O=2 
N=2 
E=5 
O=5 
N=2 
E=5 
O=5 
N=5 
GDP (income measure) 0.168 0.167 0.174 0.191 
Consumption 0.342 0.341 0.347 0.368 
Investment 0.135 0.132 0.146 0.164 
Exports 0.214 0.215 0.238 0.341 
Imports -0.210 -0.212 -0.193 -0.100 
  
Nominal before tax wage 0.069 0.067 0.077 0.134 
Real take-home consumption wage 0.300 0.299 0.303 0.326 
Consumer price index -0.230 -0.231 -0.225 -0.191 
  
Total employment 0.208 0.208 0.210 0.226 
Unemployment rate (%) -2.612 -2.607 -2.639 -2.835 
Total population 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
Total energy consumption (in GWh) -3.149 -3.180 -3.144 -3.114 
Rebound effect (%) 37.0 36.4 37.1 37.7 
 
*Note: E = electricity sectors, O = other energy sectors and N = non-energy sectors
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Table 5.5 Impact of recycling government revenues through adjusting government expenditure or 
adjusting income tax (percentage changes from base year) 
 No budget 
constraint 
Government 
expenditure 
adjusting 
Income tax 
adjusting 
GDP (income measure) 0.168 0.203 0.342 
Consumption 0.342 0.396 0.694 
Investment 0.135 0.133 0.329 
Exports 0.214 0.012 0.188 
Imports -0.210 -0.023 0.028 
  
Nominal before tax wage 0.069 0.242 0.094 
Real take-home consumption wage 0.300 0.369 0.549 
Consumer price index -0.230 -0.127 -0.215 
  
Total employment 0.208 0.256 0.377 
Unemployment rate (%) -2.612 -3.207 -4.730 
Total government expenditure 0.000 0.605 0.000 
  
Total energy consumption (in GWh) -3.149 -3.165 -2.911 
Rebound effect (%) 37.0 36.7 41.8 
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Table 5.6 Impact of introducing a simultaneous improvement of 5 per cent in energy efficiency and a 
negative shock to technical progress (percentage changes from base year) 
 No cost to 
implement 
efficiency 
improvement 
One-third of 
efficiency 
impact offset 
by additional 
labour costs 
Two-thirds 
of efficiency 
impact offset 
by additional 
labour costs 
Efficiency 
impact fully 
offset by 
additional 
labour costs 
GDP (income measure) 0.168 0.019 -0.141 -0.333
Consumption 0.342 0.228 0.104 -0.044
Investment 0.135 -0.001 -0.147 -0.319
Exports 0.214 0.073 -0.080 -0.254
Imports -0.210 -0.181 -0.146 -0.094
  
Nominal before tax wage 0.069 0.106 0.148 0.207
Real take-home consumption 
wage 
0.300 0.222 0.137 0.035
Consumer price index -0.230 -0.115 0.012 0.172
  
Total employment 0.208 0.155 0.096 0.025
Unemployment rate (%) -2.612 -1.941 -1.201 -0.308
Total population 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
  
Total energy consumption (in 
GWh) 
-3.149 -3.437 -3.759 -4.132
Rebound effect (%) 37.0 31.3 24.8 17.4
 
Note: The “costly policy” sensitivity in Figure 5.5 to 5.12 relate to the simulation in the final column 
here above. 
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Table 5.7 Impact of changing the specification of the labour market (percentage changes from base 
year) 
 Bargaining Exogenous Labour 
Supply 
Real Wage Resistance 
 Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
GDP (income measure) 0.105 0.168 -0.019 -0.037 0.225 0.897
Consumption 0.365 0.342 0.299 0.213 0.428 0.799
Investment 0.062 0.135 -0.151 -0.070 0.268 0.862
Exports -0.027 0.214 -0.193 -0.034 0.133 1.119
Imports -0.226 -0.210 -0.240 -0.173 -0.212 -0.337
  
Nominal before tax wage 0.010 0.069 0.370 0.281 -0.388 -0.676
Real take-home consumption 
wage 
0.280 0.300 0.569 0.385 0.000 0.000
Consumer price index -0.269 -0.230 -0.198 -0.103 -0.388 -0.676
  
Total employment 0.195 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.383 0.949
Unemployment rate (%) -2.441 -2.612 0.000 0.000 -4.804 -11.878
Total population 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
  
Total energy consumption (in 
GWh) 
-2.349 -3.149 -2.468 -3.357 -2.234 -2.413
Rebound effect (%) 53.0 37.0 50.6 32.9 55.3 51.7
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Figure 5.5 Impact on total energy consumption for central case and sensitivity analysis 
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Figure 5.6 Impact on GDP for central case plus sensitivity analysis 
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Figure 5.7 Impact on employment for central case plus sensitivity analysis 
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Figure 5.8 Impact on CO2 emissions from fuel use for central case and sensitivity analysis 
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Figure 5.9 Impact on GDP/CO2 emissions from fuel use for central case and sensitivity analysis 
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Figure 5.10 Impact on CO2 emissions from fuel use divided by GDP for central case and sensitivity 
analysis 
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Figure 5.11 Impact on GDP divided by non-electricity energy for central case and sensitivity analysis 
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Figure 5.12 Impact on GDP divided by electricity energy for central case and sensitivity analysis 
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APPENDIX 1. A CONDENSED VERSION OF UKENVI 
 
 
       Equations                                                          Short run 
 
(1) Gross Output Price 
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(9) Labour demand 
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(14) Commodity demand 
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 App. 1. (cont.) Equations 
 
 
Short run 
 
(15) Consumption Demand 
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(16) Investment Demand 
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(17) Government Demand 
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(18) Export Demand 
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(19) Intermediate Demand 
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(20) Intermediate Composite 
Demand 
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(21) Value Added Demand 
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(22) Pollutants (output-pollution 
coefficient) 
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(23) Pollutants (CO2) 
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Multi-period model 
 
  
Stock up-dating equations 
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(26) Capital Stock 
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NOTATION 
 
Activity-Commodities 
 
i, j are, respectively, the activity and commodity subscripts (There are twenty-five of each in 
UKENVI: see Appendix 2.) 
 
Transactors 
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RUK = Rest of the UK, ROW = Rest of World 
 
Functions 
 
pm (.), pq(.), pv(.) CES cost function 
 
kS(.), w(.)  Factor supply or wage-setting equations 
 
Kd(.), Nd(.), Rd(.) CES input demand functions 
 
C(.), I(.), X(.)  Armington consumption, investment and export demand functions, 
   homogenous of degree zero in prices and one in quantities 
 
Variables and parameters 
 
C  consumption 
 
D  exogenous export demand 
 
G  government demand for local goods 
 
I  investment demand for local goods 
 
Id  investment demand by activity 
 
Kd, KS, K capital demand, capital supply and capital employment 
 
L  labour force 
 
M  intermediate composite output 
 
Nd, NS, N labour demand, labour supply and labour employment 
 
Q  commodity/activity output 
 
R  intermediate demand 
 
T  nominal transfers from outwith the region 
 
V  value added 
 
X  exports 
 
Y  household nominal income 
 
bij  elements of capital matrix 
 
cpi, kpi  consumer and capital price indices 
 
d  physical depreciation 
 
h  capital stock adjustment parameter  
 
nmg   net migration 
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pm  price intermediate composite 
 
pq  vector of commodity prices 
 
pv  price of value added 
 
tn, tk  average direct tax on labour and capital income 
 
u  unemployment rate 
 
Wn, Wk price of labour to the firm, capital rental 
 
<  share of factor income retained in region 
 
T  consumption weights 
 
J  capital weights 
 
POLk  quantity of pollutant k (output-pollution approach)  
 
POLCO2 quantity of CO2  
 
Iik  output-pollution coefficients 
 
eij  fuel use emissions factors 
 
fij  fuel purchases 
 
gi  import emissions factors 
 
Ni  import purchases 
 
Gi  process output-pollution coefficients 
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APPENDIX 2:  DATA SOURCES AND THE UK SAM 
 
For this report, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model – UKENVI - has been 
developed and used to simulate a range of alternative energy efficiency improvements.  This 
model relies on an economic dataset parameterised on an appropriately constructed Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) of the UK, which is itself constructed around an Input-Output (IO) 
table of the UK for 2000.  Due to the lack of appropriately constructed official annual IO 
tables for the UK, this IO table was constructed using data from previously published official 
UK economic accounts.  Part 1 details how an appropriately disaggregated 25-sector IO table 
for the UK was constructed for the year 2000, while Part 2 explains how this table was 
augmented with information from a set of Income-Expenditure (IE) accounts to construct the 
benchmark SAM dataset for UKENVI.  Part 3 explains how the environmental input-
pollution coefficients were constructed. 
 
Part 1: Construction of Input-Output database for the United Kingdom in 2000 
A: Introduction 
UKENVI is a flexible modelling framework that can be used to simulate the system-wide effects of 
different economic shocks.  The framework can be used to simulate regional or national economies, 
and has recently been used for simulation of the economy of Scotland (Hanley et al, 2006).  The input 
to UKENVI is an appropriately constructed SAM for the target economy, built around an IO table for 
a chosen base year.  For this case, a SAM was constructed for the UK in 2000, built around an IO 
table for 2000.  
 
This United Kingdom IO table for 2000 needs to be constructed as an appropriate official IO table has 
not been published for the UK since 1995.  It is believed that UK tables for 2000 will be published 
towards the end of 2007, however this is too late for this project, making it necessary that IO tables 
are estimated. 
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 Currently, National Statistics produce annual Supply-Use Tables (SUT) for the UK, however in order 
to convert these into analytical IO format, extra data are required on commodity taxes, distribution 
margins and imports at the sectoral level.  This would allow production of a Product-by-Industry (PxI) 
IO table, which can then be converted into a Product-by-Product (PxP) or Industry-by-Industry (IxI) 
format using a make matrix.  However due to confidentiality constraints National Statistics do not 
make these commodity tax, distribution margin or make matrices public, so the necessary conversions 
cannot be made to the annually published SUT.  The option we have chosen at the current time is to 
roll the 1995 analytical tables forward to 2000.  This method is identical to that used for a previous 
ESRC-funded project and an existing EPSRC-funded project which required a UK IO table for 1999 
and 2000 respectively.   
 
Before the method is outlined, we highlight one major problem with the approach used.  The control 
total data that are suitable for rolling forward the 1995 analytical tables are the column totals of the 
SUT, which give gross industry output.  However, only PxI and PxP tables are available for 1995.  
We cannot roll forward the PxP tables because the SUT only gives gross output of products in 
purchaser prices, and do not distinguish between imports and locally produced gods.  Therefore, the 
approach we use is to roll forward the 1995 PxI tables, and then use a mechanical balance program to 
product an IxI table for the UK in 2000.   
 
The balancing process means that we allow the program to randomly reallocate products to industries, 
rather than systematically reallocating the off-diagonal elements from the make matrix (of which we 
have no knowledge).  As previously noted, this process is obviously unsatisfactory since we would 
hope to use an official National Statistics publication.  However without analytical tables for the UK 
economy since 1995, this is a necessary process. 
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B: Method 
As explained above, the method used to estimate a UK IO table for the year 2000 begins with the 
1995 Domestic Use table.  This 122-sector table is then converted to 2000 prices using a GDP 
deflator.  Coefficients are then calculated from the updated Domestic Use table, which give the 
purchases made by each sector i from other domestic sectors j, imports and taxes on products as a 
proportion of total sectoral i output.  The published 2000 SUT for the UK is also formatted at this 
stage to provide consistent sectoral totals for intermediate inputs at purchasers’ prices (which include 
domestic and imported inputs and taxes on products) as well as sectoral totals for taxes on production, 
compensation of employees and gross operating surplus. 
 
The next step uses the elements gathered above to construct an unbalanced table, which is then 
balanced using a mechanical balancing procedure.   Firstly, the sectoral coefficients for the 
intermediate inputs from the updated Domestic Use table are applied to the 2000 SUT sectoral totals 
for intermediate inputs.  Then the values for taxes on production, compensation of employees and 
gross operating surplus are put into the unbalanced table as they appear in the aggregated 2000 SUT.  
The resulting table is unbalanced as the rows and columns (showing sectoral gross inputs and outputs) 
aren’t equal – which is necessary for an analytical IO table.  The column totals sum to gross output 
from the UK SUT for 2000 by construction, however the rows remain unbalanced at this stage. 
 
At this stage, the unbalanced table is aggregated from 122 sectors to the required level of sectoral 
aggregation.  UKENVI can operate with 25 sectors, including five energy sectors  - coal, gas, oil and 
electricity (renewable and non-renewable).  The specific sectoral aggregation for this project was 
discussed with DEFRA to provide information for a range of sectors of particular interest.  The model 
was initially balanced to 24 sectors however, due to the UK SUT tables not distinguishing between 
renewable and non-renewable electricity generation.  The electricity sector was disaggregated into 
these two sub-sectors after the IO table was balanced.  The sectoral aggregation, with the IOC and 
SIC codes used, is shown in Table 2A below. 
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Table 2A:  Sectoral aggregation used for UK 2000 IO table 
Sector SIC (92) 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1, 2, 5 
Other mining and quarrying, including oil and gas 
extraction 11 to 14 
Mfr - Food and drink 15.1 to 16 
Mfr - Textiles 17.1 to 19.3 
Mfr - Pulp, paper and articles of paper and board 21.1 to 21.2 
Mfr - Glass and glass products, ceramic goods and clay 
products 26.1 to 26.4 
Mfr - Cement, lime plaster and articles in concrete, plaster 
and cement and other non-metallic products 26.5 to 26.8 
Mfr - Iron, steel first processing, and casting 27.1 to 27.5 
Mfr - Other metal products 28.1 to 28.7 
Mfr - Other machinery 29.1 to 29.7 
Mfr - Electrical and electronics 30 to 33 
Mfr - Other manufacturing 20, 22, 24.11 to 25.2, 34 to 37 
Water 41 
Construction 45 
Distribution and transport 50 to 63 
Communications, finance and business 64.1 to 72 and 74.11 to 74.8 
Research and development 73 
Public admin and education 75+80 
Health and social work 85.1-85.3 
Other services 90-95 
Coal (Extraction) 10 
Oil processing and nuclear refining 23 
Gas 40.2 to 40.3 
Electricity - renewable 40.1 
Electricity - non-renewable 40.1 
 
The final stage of the construction is to create control totals for the new 2000 IO table and to balance 
the unbalanced table to these totals.  Control totals are needed for sectoral gross output/inputs, all 
elements of final demand (households, government, investment, inventories (stocks) and exports) and 
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primary inputs (imports to the UK, taxes paid on products and production, compensation of 
employees and gross operating surplus).  Control totals for sectoral gross outputs/inputs are taken as 
sectoral gross output at basic prices from the UK SUT for 2000.  Final demand control totals for 
households (including non-profit institutions serving households), general government, investment (as 
gross fixed capital formation), inventories and stocks and exports to the rest of the World are taken 
from the SUT for 2000 figures for total consumption by these groups. 
 
Control totals for primary inputs are then all that is necessary for the balanced UK IO table.  Firstly, 
totals are available from the UK 2000 SUT for compensation of employees, gross operating surplus, 
net taxes on production and net taxes on products.  It is a feature of a balanced IO table that the totals 
for final demands balance the totals for primary inputs.  The remaining control total for imports to the 
UK are thus constrained by this identity, making this figure the difference between total final 
demands and total primary inputs without imports. 
 
The last part of the procedure is to apply the RAS balancing technique to the unbalanced table, using 
all the control totals obtained at the previous stages, and the unbalanced table.  As previously stated, 
this adjusts the entries in the unbalanced table to constrain them to the control totals, and provides a 
balanced 24-sector IO table for the UK in 2000. 
 
C: Electricity disaggregation 
As noted above, the UK IO table was constructed with a single electricity sector.  AMOSENVI  
(Hanley et al, 2006) used experimental data for 1999 from the Scottish Executive to disaggregate this 
single row and column in the IO accounts for Scotland into five electricity generation technologies – 
nuclear, coal, gas, hydro and wind.  This data was used in the absence of official data on the different 
purchases of different electricity generation technologies, however the data were adjusted to reflect 
the differences in the pattern of electricity generation in the UK compared to Scotland.  
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Thus, the single UK electricity sector was disaggregated into five electricity generation sectors based 
on the experimental data for generation facilities in Scotland, before being aggregated to renewable 
and non-renewable for the UKENVI model.  The final composition of the UK electricity sector 
(between renewables and non-renewables) will differ from that of the UK, reflecting the larger share 
of electricity generated in Scotland from renewable technologies (around 10 per cent compared to 3.5 
per cent), the greater use of nuclear generation technology in Scotland, and the correspondingly 
smaller share of gas for electricity generation than in the UK as a whole. 
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Part 2: UK Income and Expenditure (IE) accounts for 2000 
 
A set of income-expenditure accounts for the United Kingdom in 2000 was constructed to meet all the 
additional data requirements for construction of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM).  Hence, each 
entry necessary for extending the UK 2000 Input-Output (IO) table into a SAM would come from 
within these income and expenditure accounts.  Completion of a set of internally consistent income-
expenditure accounts means that the SAM will therefore automatically balance.  Balancing is 
constrained by the fixed IO entries and it is therefore necessary to manually balance the SAM on the 
basis of the additional entries in the income-expenditure accounts alone. 
 
On of the key characteristics of a SAM is that it is an example of single-entry bookkeeping, in that 
any item of expenditure in one account (a column entry) must appear as an item of income in another 
(a row entry).  By constructing five sets of income-expenditure accounts – covering households, 
corporations, government, capital and the external sector – observing this rule, it is possible to fulfil 
all the additional data requirements and create a balance SAM. 
 
In constructing the income-expenditure accounts we begin with the three local transactors – 
households, corporations and government – for which data are more readily available from existing 
published sources.  Figure 1 shows the outline of the format used for these three accounts. 
 
Figure 1:  Template used to construct income-expenditure accounts for the three local transactors 
(households, corporations and government) 
 
Income Expenditure 
Income from employment (Households 
only)* 
IO final demand expenditure (including 
expenditure taxes)* 
Net commodity taxes (Government only)*  
 95
Income from other value added (OVA)*  
  
Payments from corporations** Payments to corporations** 
Payments from government** Payments to government** 
Payments from households** Payments to households** 
  
Transfers from ROW*** Transfers to ROW*** 
 Payments to capital (savings)*** 
 
Notes: 
1.  Items marked with * are fixed by the balanced IO table (using a share parameter in the case of 
income from OVA 
2.  Items marked with ** are constrained by the corresponding entry in another account – e.g. 
payments to corporations in the household account must correspond to payments from households in 
the corporations account. 
3.  Items marked *** are entries which ensure that income equals expenditure, and thus balance the 
income-expenditure account. 
 
The Household Account 
 
Information necessary to complete the household accounts included income from employment and 
total expenditure (both of which were taken from the UK IO table).  Additional information required 
for this account, including total household income and household share of other value added (OVA), 
came from the UK Blue Book (ONS, 2004).  Payments from corporations was the sum of three 
elements - total dividend payments by UK companies going to UK households, estimated using Hill 
and Taylor (2001), income generated from private pensions and other mixed income (both from the 
Blue Book). 
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Total payments from government were again the sum of three elements – social security payments 
(taken from the UK Blue Book), dividends from public corporations to UK households (based on data 
from Hill and Taylor, 2001) and net other mixed income.  Total household income for 2000 in the UK 
was known, and so payments to the external sector were used as the balancing item in the household 
income account.   
 
Total household expenditure was the sum of payments to corporations, government, external sector 
and savings (payments to capital).  The payment to corporations’ element was the balancing item in 
this account, given the difficulty in estimating this figure.  Payments to government are estimated 
from a number of taxes; specifically income and capital gains tax, inheritance tax, stamp duties, 
insurance premium tax, council tax and social security contributions.  For each of these taxes we 
obtain values for the total government receipts in each financial year 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 and 
annualise these figures to produce a value for 2000, using one quarter of the 1999-2000 figure and 
three-quarters of the 2000-2001 figure.   
 
In order to estimate UK household payments to the rest of the world it was required to estimate the 
portion of wage and non-wage income transferred.  The final element in the household expenditure 
account, households savings (or payments to capital) is estimated by taking the ratio of household 
saving to income (5.54%) from the UK 2004 Blue Book (gross saving as a portion of total resources) 
and applying this ratio to the control figure for total household income. 
 
The Government Account 
 
The entries in the UK government income-expenditure accounts that can be drawn directly from the 
UK Input-Output table for 2000 are final demand expenditure and net commodity tax income.  Total 
government expenditure in the UK can also be obtained, but not directly from the UK IO tables for 
2000.  It can be estimated as the annualised (as per above) figure for Total Government Expenditure 
from PESA (2002/3) (HM Treasury, 2004).  Also, the value for government income from Other Value 
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Added (OVA) are estimated as the value for Other Value Added from the Public administration and 
defence sectors within the UK IO table for 2000. 
 
The other entries in the government income account were payments from households (which was 
taken as the households payments to government figure) and payments from corporations (which was 
the balancing item in the government income account). 
 
The other entries in the government expenditure account were payments to households (taken from 
the household income account), payments to the external sector (equal to the amount of net subsidies 
paid by the UK government to the rest of the world (UK Blue Book, 2004)), payments to capital 
(calculated from the investment data required for the CGE model) and payments to corporations 
(which was the balancing item in this account). 
 
The Corporate Account 
 
The IO items “income from employment” and “IO expenditure” are not relevant in the corporate 
account of the income-expenditure accounts as these are already taken account of within the borders 
of the input-output table, with sectoral information on both these values. 
 
Income (OVA) in the corporate account is equal to total OVA (from the IO table) minus OVA in the 
government and household income accounts.  Payments from corporation to other corporations will 
be, by definition, equal to zero in an aggregate account.  All outlays for one corporation in the UK 
will be offset in the income-expenditure accounts by a symmetrical entry for another corporation in 
the UK. 
 
Payments to corporations from government and households were obtained from the earlier income 
expenditure accounts, while payments from the external sector were also estimated.  On the 
expenditure side, payments to government, household and the external sector were taken from 
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previous balanced accounts.  Payments to capital (savings) were equivalent to receipts from 
corporations in the capital income account calculated below. 
 
The External Account 
 
Income from the sale of goods and services in the UK by the external transactor (the rest of the world) 
is given the import row of the UK IO table for 2000.  Similarly, the export expenditure column in the 
IO table gives expenditure on UK goods and services by the external transactor.  The additional items 
to account for in the SAM are transfers of income in both directions – i.e. between firms operating in 
the UK, local households and government, and the external transactor.  However, these are all 
accounted for in the government, corporation and household accounts detailed above. 
 
The Capital Account 
 
Receipts to the capital account consist of savings from the household, corporations, government and 
external accounts.  Capital expenditures are gross fixed capital formation and stock building, which 
are determined in the IO table for the UK in 2000.  The extra information required for the income part 
of this account come from the payments to capital values in the expenditure sections of the household 
and government accounts.  The income from corporations figure is used as the balancing item in this 
account. 
 
Investment demands 
 
The IO table and SAM contain information on which portion of each sectors outputs are used for the 
purposes of capital formation.  However, they do not tell us in which sectors the demand for this 
capital formation comes from. For example, if a bank decides to invest in a new building and 
contracts a local construction firm to build it, this will enter the IO accounts as a final demand for 
construction output in the Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation column of the IO table.  In other 
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words, what is provided is information on the supply of capital formation.  For CGE modelling, the 
supply of capital formation in the UK economy is also required. 
 
The distribution of investment across the production sectors of the economy is another variable 
required for the base year data set of the CGE model, to allow the estimate of capital stocks.  
Therefore, it is assumed that investment is equal to long-run depreciation in the base year (where all 
markets are taken to be in long-run equilibrium).  Thus, the base year capital stock in each sector is 
estimated by grossing up investment demands using the depreciation rate for capital – i.e. dividing 
each sectors investment demand by the depreciation rate, which is assumed, in the absence of 
econometric estimates, to be equal to 0.15 in each sector. 
 
Labour supply data 
 
In a SAM worksheet the (full-time equivalent, FTE) labour employed by each of the 25 UK 
production sectors is reported in the base year, 2000.  The FTE sectoral employment figures for 2000 
in the UK are calculated from the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) for Great Britain for 2000, plus 
employment data at the same sectoral aggregation in Northern Ireland from the Northern Ireland 
Annual Business Inquiry (NIABI).  Part-time workers were assumed to be equal to 0.3 of full-time 
workers. 
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Part 3: Construction of the UK input-pollution coefficients for the UKENVI model 
 
There are four types of changes in economic activity that will affect the level of atmospheric 
emissions resulting from that economic activity.  Scale and compositional effects relate to the size of a 
region, and the sectors that make up the economic activity of that region.  As the scale of a region 
changes there would be expected to be a resulting impact on emissions from that increased activity.  
Similarly, as the economic composition of industry within a region changes, it would be expected that 
the level of emissions would alter.  A third type of change will occur from changes in production 
technology, as the relationship between economic output and emissions changes, however modelling 
this element is beyond the scope of UKENVI model. 
 
The fourth type of change is that coming from changes in fuel input use, and it is this change that is 
modelled in UKENVI.  All sectoral pollution is linked to sectoral uses of fuel in the form of coal, oil 
and gas, and so as UKENVI predicts changes in the sectoral demand for each fuel type, the impact of 
these changes on emissions can be estimated. 
 
The common way to model economic-environmental linkages is through the use of output-pollution 
coefficients.  This uses the base year relationship between output and emissions, and can be used to 
relate changes in sectoral output to changes in emission by each sector.  This was used in 
AMOSENVI to account for the production of sectors that were inherently emitting, irrespective of 
production technology used.  With UKENVI however, the focus is solely on changes in energy use 
related CO2 emissions, i.e. changes in emissions due to changes in energy use.  As such, the changes 
in total emissions may be different because as activity levels change, non-fuel combustion process 
emissions may change. 
 
For each sector, input-pollution coefficients were estimated using data on each sector’s use of oil, coal 
and gas fuels in 2000 (from ONS data) and physical emissions factors for the UK from 1999, linking 
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emissions by fuel to use of that fuel in each of the 25 sectors of UKENVI.  It was necessary to use 
physical emissions factors for 1999, as more recently published data were not available.   
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1
 In fact Pearce (2001) includes a fourth motivation, but it applies to improvements in the efficiency 
of households’ direct energy use, which we do not consider in this paper. 
 
3 UKENVI is a UK CGE with an appropriate sectoral disaggregation and set of linked pollution 
coefficients, developed specifically to allow us to investigate environmental impacts.  
4 Parameter D is calibrated so as to replicate the base period (as is E in equation [5]). These calibrated 
parameters play no part in determining the sensitivity of the endogenous variables to exogenous 
disturbances but the initial assumption of equilibrium is an important assumption,  
5 Our treatment is wholly consistent with sectoral investment being determined by the relationship 
between the capital rental rate and the user cost of capital.  The capital rental rate is the rental that 
would have to be paid in a competitive market for the (sector specific) physical capital: the user cost 
is the total cost to the firm of employing a unit of capital.  Given that we take the interest, capital 
depreciation and tax rates to be exogenous, the capital price index is the only endogenous component 
of the user cost.  If the rental rate exceeds the user cost, desired capital stock is greater than the actual 
capital stock and there is therefore an incentive to increase capital stock.  The resultant capital 
accumulation puts downward pressure on rental rates and so tends to restore equilibrium.  In the long-
run, the capital rental rate equals the user cost in each sector, and the risk-adjusted rate of return is 
equalised between sectors.  
6 Note that this treatment of pollution generation from imports implies the assumption that the 
composition of imports from RUK and ROW is fixed.  
7 Indicator 1 in Scottish Executive (200a, 2003) 
8 Indicators 12 and 13 in Scottish Executive (2002a, 2003) 
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